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ABSTRACT 
 Online video streaming applications enable users to watch 
over-the-air broadcast programs at any time and almost on any 
device.  As such, they challenge the pertinence of traditional vid-
eo distribution law and the broadcast network system on which it 
is based.  Congress enacted the Transmit Clause of the 1976 
Copyright Act to resolve the high-stakes tussle between broad-
casters and cable providers.  But, today, that provision is ill-
suited to resolving whether unauthorized streaming infringes on 
broadcasters’ copyright to perform works publicly.  Its scope is 
ambiguous enough that judges across the country were notably 
divided on whether it reaches online video distribution—that is, 
until the Supreme Court ruled that it does in a divided opinion 
last term in ABC v. Aereo. 
 Remarkably, none of the courts to address the question, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, consulted the interpretations of video dis-
tribution law by the agencies to which Congress delegated the 
broad authority of doing so in closely related statutes.  The courts 
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assumed that they alone should interpret the scope of the Trans-
mit Clause in the absence of a specific delegation from Congress 
to an agency to interpret the provision. 
 This Article argues that courts instead should consult all of the 
public law that Congress set in motion in the area of video distri-
bution law before resolving novel disputes over the scope of the 
Transmit Clause.  This reform would have purchase when, as is 
the case today, the Copyright Office and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission have authority to interpret online video dis-
tribution under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, 
respectively.  Although neither agency has the authority to inter-
pret the Transmit Clause, current administrative law doctrine 
suggests that those agencies’ interpretations of closely related 
statutes are worthy of respect, if not deference.  This Article ac-
cordingly argues for a more careful approach to substantive judi-
cial review in this area than the courts have employed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s popular retail internet applications are completely different 
from the mass market communication technologies that preceded them.  
Twentieth century broadcasting empowered audiences to tune in together to 
live and recorded performances.  It dramatically enlarged the size of audi-
ences that could experience live and recorded programming simultaneously.  
Broadcast television in this regard was the great hearth of American culture 
for most of the twentieth century.1  The major networks were to be the trus-
tees of the public airwaves that curated every minute of programming for 
the mass public in order to keep viewers interested. 
As transformative as broadcasting was, however, the Internet has 
turned the political economy and cultural practices of video distribution in-
side out.  Today, audiences are not so beholden to broadcast programmers.  
Current video distribution technologies have unmoored performance from 
time and place so that each viewer is in far more control over when and 
how she watches television programs than she was before.  Viewers can 
now experience performances at the time and in the order of their choosing 
on almost whatever networked device they wish. 
With so much in flux, after years at the center of the mass communica-
tion political economy, the broadcast incumbents today act as though they 
have everything to lose.  They have done almost everything in their power 
to moderate the disruptive effects of online video distribution. 
One of the primary resources to which they have turned to retain their 
market position is public law.  They have done so in at least three ways.  
First, they have lobbied Congress to enact statutes or amend existing ones 
to account for new technologies as they emerge.  Congress accordingly has 
added new exclusive copyrights and amended the scope of existing ones 
with specific technologies in mind.  Second, the incumbents have petitioned 
the pertinent administrative agencies to adopt interpretations of existing law 
that further secure their market position.  Pursuant to their delegated author-
ity under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively, the 
Copyright Office and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
                                                          
 1.  See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, LISTENING IN: RADIO AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 
(2004); J. FRED MACDONALD, ONE NATION UNDER TELEVISION: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
NETWORK TV (1993). 
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routinely hear such petitions and comments in proceedings involving novel 
communications technologies.  Third, the incumbents have challenged the 
emergent technologies in court, relying on interpretations of existing law 
that inure to their benefit.  It is to this strategy—appeal to courts—on which 
I focus in this Article.  The majority and dissenting opinions in the United 
States Supreme Court’s American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc.2 
decision from this past June provide an important opportunity to assess how 
courts might address technological novelty in the absence of clarity in exist-
ing public law.  There, broadcasters argued that an upstart online video dis-
tributor infringed on their copyright to “perform” works “publicly” when it 
made broadcasters’ programs available without authorization.  The Court 
agreed with broadcasters. 
Rather than focus on the substantive outcome of the litigation, I focus 
here on the interpretive strategies that the courts (the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Aereo in particular) have employed to make sense of the 
Transmit Clause,3 a provision that Congress wrote well before any of its 
members knew anything about networked communications, let alone online 
video streaming.  Judges, I will show, were silent on efforts by the Copy-
right Office and the FCC to make sense of online video streaming in pro-
ceedings involving related provisions in the Copyright Act and the Com-
munications Act.  They assumed that courts alone could or should make 
sense of a statutory provision absent a specific delegation to the agencies to 
interpret the provision. 
The courts’ silence is remarkable at least because judges have long 
recognized that they are not always good at making legal sense of disrup-
tive communication technologies.  To be sure, sometimes they can, should, 
and do define legal obligations and rights in the first instance, without con-
sulting other institutions.  Adjudications concerning the scope of individual 
constitutional rights like privacy or fact-dependent considerations like cop-
yright fair use, for example, are the province of the courts.4  Judges in these 
cases are not and should not be any more reticent to resolve disputes involv-
ing disruptive technologies than they are for conventional ones. 
In other legislative fields, however, courts are careful not to impose 
their interpretations of existing statutes without first consulting institutions 
created for that very purpose.  Scholars generally associate this reticence 
                                                          
 2.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 3.  17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012). 
 4.  It is worth noting here that, although fair use is explicitly defined in the Copyright Act, 
observers have generally recognized it to be a judge-created doctrine that is only really elaborated 
in adjudication.  I discuss the fair use doctrine below.  See infra notes 277–281 and accompanying 
text.   
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with deference.5  Deference has a special meaning in administrative law 
doctrine, referring generally to courts’ relative high regard for agency con-
clusions.6  For constitutional law and legal process scholars, the concept of 
deference is a trans-substantive idea that connotes respect for the formal au-
thority or decisionmaking capacity of other institutions.7 
In both kinds of cases—those where they decide in the first instance 
without consulting other institutions and those in which they actively defer 
to agencies—courts are almost always explicitly mindful of the limits of 
their institutional authority and capacity to resolve disputes involving novel 
communication technologies.  I argue here that, in the recent online video 
distribution cases on the scope of the Transmit Clause, courts should have 
been far more respectful than they were of recent and ongoing proceedings 
at the Copyright Office and the FCC on how to treat those technologies un-
der sister provisions in the Copyright Act and the Communications Act. 
Courts, as it turns out, are not the only ones that jump the gun to re-
solve substantive policy disputes.  Legal commentators, too, have some-
times been far too eager to determine what the “proper balance” between 
content owners, innovators, and users ought to be.8  To be sure, some in-
formation law scholars have remarked on the relative institutional roles that 
legislatures, agencies, and courts play in resolving disputes involving net-
worked communications.9  But scholars have avoided or been silent on the 
point in the context of video distribution. 
                                                          
 5.  See generally LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACT 320 (1965). 
 6.  See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 7.  See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 765–66 (1997); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, 
Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 2029, 2032–33 (2011); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1061, 1072 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common 
Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 483 (2010) (referring to the “ordinary” components of administra-
tive law as “statutory and regulatory requirements, such as the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) or Executive Order 12,866 and associated administrative law doctrines”); Robert A. 
Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional 
Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrari-
ness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein 
& Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003). 
 8.  See, e.g., Mary Rasenberger & Christine Pepe, Copyright Enforcement and Online File 
Hosting Services: Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance?, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 627, 
631 (2012); Sebastian Wyatt Novak, Note, “A Million Little Antennas:” The Second Circuit’s De-
cision in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., and the Next Great United States Supreme Court Copy-
right Battle, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 287 (2013). 
 9.  See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 
(2007) (using the theory of economic externalities to posit a theory of IP property rights distribu-
tion); Thomas Fetzer & Christopher S. Yoo, New Technologies and Constitutional Law, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner & Cher-
yl Saunders eds., 2013); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 
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The problem with this myopic focus on substantive policy outcomes is 
that it has a very narrow view of what the Internet is.  I assume here that it 
is far more than an innovation machine.10  The Internet constitutes and in-
habits all aspects of our public and private lives.  Parties accordingly are 
now more than ever asking courts to resolve high-stakes disputes like those 
at issue in the Aereo litigation because innovation is an indeterminate objec-
tive.  What is more, these disputes involve competing public policy priori-
ties and interests for which there is often no easy answer in existing law.  
The focus on substantive policy outcomes accordingly ignores the far more 
relevant question today of how to make legal sense of laws when novel 
communication technologies like live video streaming emerge and the per-
tinent existing public laws provide no clear answer.  I propose here a reform 
that would have courts leave these problems to Congress and the agencies 
to whom it has delegated the responsibility of resolving such questions in 
the first instance.  This Article considers the recent video distribution cases 
and Aereo in particular to explain the point. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, I illustrate that, in the 
recent online streaming video cases, courts proceeded in their analysis of 
the public performance right on the assumption that they are best situated to 
resolve questions about novel technologies.  I focus in particular on the re-
cent litigation involving Aereo. 
In Part II, I situate the Transmit Clause in its historical and legislative 
context.  I show that it was just one part of a broader reform addressed to 
the emergence of cable television and the consequent shift in the political 
economy of broadcast programming distribution.  I also show that Congress 
later amended the Copyright Act as well as the Communications Act to ac-
count for the emergence of disruptive video programming distribution tech-
nologies.  And while it has incorporated the Internet and networked com-
munications technologies in these amendments, I show that Congress has 
yet to amend the scope of broadcast transmission law to include the Inter-
net.  Instead, Congress has deferred that responsibility to the Copyright Of-
fice and the FCC.  And, accordingly, both agencies have had a thing or two 
to say about broadcasters’ relative rights in the market for online video dis-
                                                          
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, at ¶ 30 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technolo-
gies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06, 855 (2004); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 96 (2010); 
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judi-
cial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 751 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, 
Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (2001); A. Michael Froomkin, 
Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 
DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164 
(2004); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2009).   
 10.  Cf. Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2015). 
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tribution.11  These agency findings, I argue, should make courts far more 
sanguine than they have been about deciding the scope of the public per-
formance right de novo, as though they are the only act in town. 
In Part III, I demonstrate that courts already have developed an appre-
ciation for the limits of their relative institutional authority and capacity in 
other information law subfields like electronic communication surveillance 
and broadband network management.  This underscores the inadequacy of 
the courts’ approach to the public performance right.  Thus, later in Part III, 
I propose that courts interpose interpretations by the Copyright Office and 
the FCC concerning the proper legal treatment of online video streaming 
under the sister provisions of the Copyright Act and the Communications 
Act.  That is, I propose that courts defer to those agencies’ conclusions as 
they would to agencies that have the specific delegated authority to interpret 
statutes in the first instance.  In the end, my argument here is for more hu-
mility in courts’ consideration of disputes concerning disruptive video dis-
tribution technologies than they have evinced to this point. 
I.  AEREO AND THE CASE OF ONLINE VIDEO STREAMING 
Viewers today have far more control over when and how they watch 
television sitcoms, dramas, live sports, and movies than they did a genera-
tion ago.12  User adoption of digital video recorders like TiVO and DVR 
cable service is not the only reason.  Networked devices manufactured by 
Simple.tv and Roku, internet-based video-on-demand applications like 
those offered by Hulu and Amazon, and “over-the-top” online video ser-
vices like those being developed by Sony and Verizon enable users to 
watch live or record-and-playback television programming whenever and 
however they want.13  According to one recent report, subscribers with 
high-speed internet connections now outnumber those with cable televi-
sion.14 
Until last summer, online streaming video distribution applications 
like Aereo and FilmOn were at the vanguard of such services.  Aereo trans-
coded over-the-air broadcast signals into a digital form for subscribers who, 
                                                          
 11.  The Copyright Office, for example, does not think the compulsory licensing law under 
the Copyright Act, the sister provision of the public performance right, covers internet transmis-
sions.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION 
ACT SECTION 109 REPORT (2008), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/section109-
final-report.pdf. 
 12.  See Alex Williams, For Millennials, the End of the TV Viewing Party, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/fashion/for-millennials-the-end-of-the-tv-viewing-
party.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore-ipad&_r=0.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Shalini Ramachandran, More Cable Companies Take TV Off Menu, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 
2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/more-cable-companies-take-tv-off-menu-1412120310.  
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in turn, wanted to watch on their laptops or other mobile devices.  For many 
observers, however, Aereo’s online streaming service was nothing more 
than a tool used by its developers to exploit broadcasters’ proprietary con-
tent without paying for it.15  Accordingly, broadcast networks and their af-
filiated local stations filed lawsuits across the country alleging that Aereo 
and FilmOn infringed their exclusive right under the Copyright Act to per-
form broadcast programs publicly.16  In many regards, the broadcasters’ 
strategy proved very successful: Aereo has shuttered its business and filed 
for bankruptcy at the end of 2014.17 
The problem is that the pertinent provision, the Transmit Clause of the 
1976 Copyright Act,18 is not particularly clear about how courts ought to 
consider user-controlled video applications like Aereo.  The statute’s defini-
tion of what constitutes a public performance is inapposite to the workings 
and predominant consumer uses of online video.19  Congress, after all, 
drafted it in an era when broadcasters controlled the time and manner by 
which the public watched broadcast fare.20  Aereo ostensibly did something 
new; their subscribers could watch broadcast network sports or TV dramas 
in whatever idiosyncratic way they chose: they could watch live or watch at 
a later time from any point in the program.21  And they could do all of this 
on virtually any device that has an internet connection.22 
The Transmit Clause is ambiguous enough on the question that judges 
across the country were divided on how to handle the various cases that 
                                                          
 15.  Cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (broadcasters 
brought suit against cable operators for violating public performance right under 1909 Copyright 
Act); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (same); Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) 
(broadcasters brought suit against first generation of online streaming video sites). 
 16.  See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Fox Television Sta-
tions v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 
F. Supp. 2d 373, 386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 17.  See infra note 120. 
 18.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (public performance right); 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(2012) 
(providing that to perform publicly under § 106 of the Copyright Act is “to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or 
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display re-
ceive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times”). 
 19.  See supra note 18. 
 20.  See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)). 
 21.  See Jerry Markon, Robert Barnes, & Cecilia Kang, Supreme Court Rules Against Start-
Up Aereo, Saying It Is Violating Copyright Laws, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court-rules-against-startup-aereo-saying-it-is-
violating-copyright-laws/2014/06/25/59756f88-fc6b-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html (ex-
plaining that Aereo rebroadcasts live television at a cheap monthly rate, where the subscribers can 
access these programs more conveniently). 
 22.  Id. 
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broadcasters brought.23  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit and a district court in Massachusetts decided that the provision does 
not include the new applications, while district courts in the District of Co-
lumbia and California decided that they do.24 
The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on appeal 
from the Second Circuit in January of this year and, in a 6–3 decision, sided 
with broadcasters.  In his opinion for the majority, Justice Breyer likened 
Aereo to cable service, the video distribution technology that Congress ex-
plicitly brought under coverage of the 1976 Copyright Act.25  The “behind-
the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its 
viewers’ screens” was unknown to policymakers in 1976, but the general 
act of retransmitting broadcast signals to subscribers without authorization 
was.26 
Justice Scalia, writing for the three dissenters, rejected the analogy to 
cable, choosing instead to liken Aereo’s service to a “copy shop” that al-
lows customers to use a copier on its premises.27   Such stores would not be 
infringing any more than Aereo is.28 
As interesting as the substantive question about the scope of protection 
under current law is or ought to be, both the majority opinion and dissent 
overlooked the important role that federal agencies play in the legislative 
field.  The Copyright Office and the FCC have for decades been applying 
the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively, to disruptive 
video distribution technologies.  For better or worse, Congress long ago de-
cided that these agencies are best situated to understand new video applica-
tions as they emerge, monitor their impact on the market, and recalibrate the 
scope of legal protections in furtherance of legislative purposes.29  They are 
charged with making legal sense of new technologies in the first instance.30 
The Justices and all of the federal judges who have heard the question, 
however, showed no respect for this arrangement.  Indeed, neither the Aereo 
majority opinion nor the dissent even acknowledged it.  They instead chose 
to interpret the scope of the public performance right without any real con-
                                                          
 23.  See, e.g., WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).   
 24.  Compare id., with Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 25.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history makes clear 
that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider.  Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers, ‘per-
form[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s]’).  Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV com-
panies that Congress amended the Act to reach.”). 
 26.  Id. at 2508. 
 27.  Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28.  Id. at 2513–14. 
 29.  See infra Part II. 
 30.  See infra Part III. 
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sideration of the agencies’ findings or reports on the question.31  I posit here 
that they did so based on the myopic assumption that they alone have the 
duty of finding the proper balance between owners and creators in the first 
instance—or at least that they are as well situated as anyone else to make 
legal sense of disruptive new technologies.32 
A.  The Aereo Service 
Aereo streamed over-the-air broadcast programming to its paying sub-
scribers.33  The company relied on three important design features to pro-
vide the service.  First, it assigned an individual antenna to a subscriber 
once it received a request from that subscriber to watch or record a pro-
gram.34  Subscribers would make their request by clicking a computer 
mouse or tapping their mobile device’s display.35  No two users would 
share the same antenna at the same time, even if they requested to watch or 
record the very same program at the same time.36  Second, Aereo trans-
coded the broadcast signal of the requested program and created an individ-
ual digital copy of that program in the requesting subscriber’s personal di-
rectory.37  Again, even when two users are watching or recording the same 
program at the same time, the stream that they receive through Aereo flows 
from the copy of the program in their own Aereo directory.38  Finally, a 
subscriber could watch the copy of the desired program on his TV, comput-
er, or mobile-device screen; no other Aereo user could ever view that par-
ticular copy.39  In short, Aereo afforded users control over when and 
through which device they watched programs.40  And it did so without au-
thorization from broadcasters. 
Aereo designed their service in this way in order to abide by the terms 
of the Second Circuit’s decision in a 2008 case involving a cable television 
remote storage digital video recorder service (“RS-DVR”).41  Cablevision, 
the principle defendant in that case, provided subscribers with RS-DVR 
                                                          
 31.  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504–11. 
 32.  See infra Part I.D. 
 33.  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 
expert reports); see also Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4408 (2009). 
 41.  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (referred 
to colloquially as “Cablevision”).  
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service to copy and transmit broadcast and nonbroadcast programming.42  
The Cablevision panel concluded that this service did not constitute a public 
performance within the meaning of the Copyright Act because, first, indi-
vidual subscribers make their own copy of a broadcast network program 
through a click of their remote control and, second, the RS-DVR service au-
tomatically transmits that individual copy to the unique subscriber whenev-
er the latter requests it.43  Cable operators have virtually no active role in an 
automated individual transmission. 
As novel as its service seemed, Aereo’s entry into the market was not 
terribly surprising.  First, applications for online streaming of broadcast and 
nonbroadcast television content had been available for years already.44  
Second, cable companies and broadcasters already were engaged in a very 
fraught battle over licensing and retransmission terms in ways that disad-
vantaged consumers.  Specifically, broadcasters and other programmers 
blacked out their signals to gain leverage in their negotiations over retrans-
mission.45  Aereo simply sought to capitalize on the dispute, advertising it-
self as the modern-day alternative to the old and greedy incumbents.46 
Legislators in Congress, meanwhile, had been (and continue to be) 
considering bills that would address online video distribution.  One bill 
would forbid cable and satellite operators, broadband providers, and other 
major media companies from engaging in anticompetitive practices against 
online video distributors, effectively giving the latter the same protections 
afforded to satellite providers.47  It would also open the possibility for 
online video distributors to negotiate with broadcasters on streaming terms.  
The basic objective of this proposal is to afford users a mix of choices for 
video programming.  The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
meanwhile, released a white paper that detailed current inadequacies in the 
                                                          
 42.  Id. at 124. 
 43.  In a useful analogy, the Cablevision court likened RS-DVR service to a store that charges 
customers to use a photocopier on-site.  Id. at 132.  As with such a store, Cablevision could not be 
held liable for violating plaintiffs’ rights under the Copyright Act because RS-DVR service auto-
mates subscriber requests, effectively removing any volitional conduct on the part of Cablevision.  
Id. 
 44.  See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
 45.  See Christopher Zara, Fox News Blackout Takes a Bite Out of Dish Network’s Pay-TV 
Subscribers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/fox-news-blackout-
takes-bite-out-dish-networks-pay-tv-subscribers-1827108.  
 46.  Aereo took out a full-page New York Times advertisement to emphasize the point.  Greg 
Sandoval, News War: Aereo Takes out Full-Page New York Times Ad as Network Threats Heat 
up, THE VERGE (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/18/4238774/aereo-takes-out-
full-page-new-york-times-ad-against-network-threats.  
 47.  Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, S. 1680, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Bryce Baschuk, 
Rockefeller Unveils Aereo Friendly Online Video Legislation for Expanded Choice, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rockefeller-unveils-aereo-n17179880063/. 
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amended Communications Act, focusing in particular on the way in which 
the 1934 Act treats different communications platforms (i.e., broadcasting, 
cable, and wireless) differently.48 
B.  The Lawsuit 
Broadcasters, however, were not going to wait for legislative action.  
The major networks and their affiliated local stations in the largest televi-
sion markets sued Aereo and FilmOn, another prominent online video 
streaming service, within a year after those services first became available.  
In cases filed in federal district courts in New York, Boston, Los Angeles, 
Washington, D.C., and elsewhere broadcasters alleged that Aereo and 
FilmOn directly infringed on broadcasters’ right to perform their programs 
publicly every time the upstarts streamed broadcast content without permis-
sion.49 
The pertinent statutory provision of the Copyright Act, the Transmit 
Clause, defines the right to perform work “publicly” as, 
[the right] to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance 
or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device 
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiv-
ing the performance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.50 
According to plaintiffs, Aereo’s method of distributing broadcast program-
ming to subscribers violates the plain terms of the statute.  It makes no dif-
ference, they alleged, if Aereo uses one big antenna (like a cable company, 
for example) or many small antennas to receive broadcast signals if, in ei-
ther case, the company is retransmitting the same program to members of 
the public.51 
                                                          
 48.  H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, MODERNIZING THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
(2014), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis/Co
mmActUpdate/20140108WhitePaper.pdf (“The primary body of law regulating these industries 
was passed in 1934 and while updated periodically, it has not been modernized in 17 years.”).  
 49.  WNET Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶¶ 43–48, Am. Broad. Cos. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 1543) (citing 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106(4), 502 (2012)).  American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”) and WNET were co-
plaintiffs in a suit against Aereo, Inc.  Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375–76.  WNET also alleged in-
fringement of their reproduction right under the Act as well as unfair competition, WNET Compl., 
supra, at ¶¶ 49–63, but the public performance claim drew the most attention.  See also WNET, 
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2013).   
 50.  17 U.S.C. § 101(2).  For the purposes of the act, “publicly” refers to “at any place where 
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances 
is gathered.”  Id. § 101(1). 
 51.  WNET Compl., supra note 49, at ¶ 3. 
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The district courts to hear the cases were of two minds: some were in-
clined to reject plaintiffs’ suit, while others were alarmed by the new online 
video applications at issue.  The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York denied broadcasters’ motion for a preliminary in-
junction, relying on the Second Circuit’s opinion from 2008 in Cablevi-
sion.52  It found that the similarities between the RS-DVR service in that 
earlier case and Aereo’s streaming service were significant.  The latter’s 
subscribers, it explained, can stop, store, and playback programs in the 
same way that cable subscribers can control video through DVR service.53  
A few months later, the United States District Court for the District of Bos-
ton reached the same conclusion.54 
Broadcasters found success in cases in D.C. and California.  A judge 
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, for 
example, found that FilmOn infringed broadcasters’ public performance 
right.55  Explicitly rejecting the Second Circuit’s reading of the Transmit 
Clause in Cablevision, the L.A.-based court explained that the underlying 
work and its transmission are not separate “performances” under Section 
101; the statute is addressed to “the performance of the copyrighted work, 
irrespective of which copy of the work the transmission is made from.”56  
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the Cal-
ifornia court’s reasoning persuasive, but nevertheless provided its own ra-
tionale for its decision.57  That court also imposed a nationwide injunction 
on online video streaming services like those provided by FilmOn and 
Aereo, excepting, of course, the states in the Second Circuit.58  The Califor-
nia district court for its part had limited its injunction to the Ninth Circuit.59  
                                                          
 52.  Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87.  Plaintiffs chose not to pursue their repro-
duction right at the preliminary injunction stage.  See id. at 376 (discussing the limited scope of 
the opinion). 
 53.  Id. at 386. 
 54.  See Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 55.  See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing Cablevision).  It decided the case before the Second 
Circuit published its opinion in April 2013. 
 56.  Id. at 1144.  FilmOn appealed the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit.  In light of 
Ninth Circuit precedent with which the Second Circuit explicitly disagreed in Cablevision, see 
Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 138–39 (2d. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing On Command Video Corp. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991)), it was probable that the two most 
prominent federal appellate courts on intellectual property matters would have been split on the 
scope of the public performance right.  Such a split never came to pass, however, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit stayed the case before it pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the appeal from the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
 57.  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33, 37, 44–52 
(D.D.C. 2013).   
 58.  Id. at 52. 
 59.  See BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. 
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Aereo, meanwhile, filed defensive lawsuits across the country, seeking to 
stave off the broadcasters’ expensive no-holds-bar litigation strategy.60 
Broadcasters appealed the adverse decisions.  Even while most federal 
courts across the country had not endorsed the Second Circuit’s Cablevision 
approach, broadcasters could not tolerate an adverse decision in the juris-
diction with the largest television market.61  They also fine-tuned their ar-
gument, focusing in particular on the live streaming aspect of Aereo’s ser-
vice (as opposed to the record-and-playback function).62 
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s decision.63  
The user control features of Aereo’s online streaming service, it held, are 
sufficiently similar to make Cablevision dispositive as a matter of stare de-
cisis.64  The panel explained that, under Cablevision, the “to the public” 
language in the Transmit Clause refers to the potential audience for the 
original transmission and not to the underlying program.65  The provision, 
it explained, cannot be read to include any and all transmissions of the same 
underlying program because such a reading could transform even private 
transmissions into public ones—say, when a viewer watches the program 
on another device in her house through her home network.66  To allow such 
a reading, the panel explained, would effectively render the “to the public 
language” superfluous.67  The only performance addressed in the provision, 
it explained, is created by the original act of transmission from broadcaster 
to the airwaves, not to the subsequent transmissions triggered by the user’s 
request to play a recorded copy of the original transmission.68  The court 
reasoned that, as in Cablevision, Aereo enables unique users to receive and 
watch their own transmission of the desired broadcast.69 
The Aereo panel also briefly examined the text and history of the 
Transmit Clause.  Echoing Cablevision, it explained that Congress explicit-
ly addressed the provision to “the emergence of cable television systems” in 
                                                          
 60.  See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Aereo, Inc. v. CBS Broadcasting, No. 13-
CV-3013 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013). 
 61.  See Brian Stelter, Aereo Wins Court Battle, Dismaying Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/media/aereo-wins-in-appeals-court-
setting-stage-for-trial-on-streaming-broadcast-tv.html?_r=0 (“The broadcasters, surprised and dis-
appointed, said they were confident they would prevail eventually.”). 
 62.  See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history makes 
clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider.  Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers, 
‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s].’)”). 
 63.  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686–87, 696 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 64.  Id. at 695.  
 65.  Id. at 687 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 66.  Id. at 688. 
 67.  Id. at 687–88 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135–36). 
 68.  Id. at 688–89 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138).   
 69.  Id. at 689–90. 
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the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s.70  Congress made their intentions all 
the clearer, moreover, when, at the same time, it created a whole new com-
pulsory licensing regime that would enable “cable systems” to retransmit 
broadcast programming.71  Together, the panel explained, the Transmit 
Clause and Section 111 were to moderate the high-stakes contest between 
broadcasters and cable operators.72  Congress, the panel continued, did no 
such thing for any other video distribution technologies at that time; it did 
not express any sense for how to structure a broad and all-inclusive statuto-
ry licensing regime that could accommodate “unanticipated technological 
developments” like online video streaming.73  The design of the Aereo ser-
vice could not have been anticipated.74  And this was not a small point for 
the panel: the difference between “public and private transmissions” in the 
1970s “was simpler than today.”75 
Judge Denny Chin wrote a forceful dissenting opinion.76  He agreed 
that Congress incorporated the public performance right and corollary com-
pulsory licensing regime in the 1976 Copyright Act in order to address ca-
ble retransmission of broadcast signals.77  But, he continued, the majority’s 
decision privileges form over substance as it would allow unauthorized re-
transmissions through “a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-
engineered . . . to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act.”78  For him, Ca-
blevision is inapplicable because the RS-DVR service in that case supple-
ments the real-time service for which cable systems pay statutory licensing 
fees under Section 111 and retransmission consent fees under the Commu-
nications Act.79 
In any event, Judge Chin continued, Congress explicitly sought to in-
corporate “all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless 
                                                          
 70.  Id. at 685 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676). 
 71.  Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012)). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 694–95. 
 74.  Id. at 694. 
 75.  Id. at 694–95. 
 76.  Id. at  696 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 77.  Id. at 704; cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) 
(holding that cable service that retransmitted broadcast signal outside local area was not a public 
performance within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (holding that cable operator’s retransmission of broadcast 
signal is not a public performance within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act). 
 78.  Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).  It is worth mentioning here that, in Ca-
blevision, the Second Circuit reversed then-District Court Judge Chin’s decision for broadcasters.  
Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 79.  Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also 47 U.S.C. §325(b)(6) (2012). 
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communications media” in their definition of “transmit.”80  Congress, he 
argued, had a broad conception of public performance that, according to the 
legislative history, included any transmissions to the public, no matter 
whether individuals can watch and record at different times or in different 
places.81  While it did not foresee video streaming over the Internet, he con-
ceded, Congress surely meant to include streaming in their definition of 
public performance under Section 101.82 
The Aereo majority’s short response to the dissent was that, after Ca-
blevision, “technical architecture matters.”83  The majority noted the plain-
tiffs’ argument that Aereo in all likelihood designed its system with that 
earlier case in mind—that is, its engineers quite plainly designed around the 
concerns that the Second Circuit identified in Cablevision.84  But that, the 
majority continued, was not itself incriminating; this is not the first time 
that a company has developed a business plan or designed an information 
sharing technology with an eye to existing law.85  Aereo provided just one 
of many emergent cloud computer services that Cablevision had arguably 
instigated.86  Like those other services, the panel suggested, the company 
merely enables subscribers to control how they watch broadcast programs.87 
C.  The Supreme Court 
The plaintiffs in the Second Circuit case filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari that the Supreme Court promptly granted early in 2014.88  The 
Court heard argument in the case in April and, a couple months later, re-
versed the Second Circuit in a 6–3 decision.89 
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, was not as taken by the 
uniqueness of Aereo’s design as the Second Circuit panel majority had 
been.90  Aereo’s one user, one antenna design, it explained, does not make 
the transmission less “public” for the purposes of the Transmit Clause.91  
                                                          
 80.  Aereo, 712 F.3d at 701 (Chin, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678). 
 81.  Id. at 698–99. 
 82.  Id. at 698. 
 83.  Id. at 694 (majority opinion). 
 84.  Id. at 693–94. 
 85.  Id. at 694. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 692. 
 88.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).  Interestingly, Aereo did not ob-
ject to the petition.   Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-
461 (Oct. 11, 2013).  Plaintiffs had filed a motion for rehearing with the full Second Circuit that 
the court promptly rejected.  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 89.  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
 90.  Id. at 2507–08.  
 91.  Id. at 2501. 
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The peculiar “behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television 
programming to its viewers’ screens” does “not render Aereo’s commercial 
objective any different from that of cable companies.”92  The company’s 
service, it explained, does not “significantly alter the viewing experience of 
Aereo’s subscribers.”93  The Transmit Clause’s language was not addressed 
solely to the original performance of the underlying work, the majority con-
tinued, but to every manner in which that underlying work is conveyed to 
members of the public.94  Congress made this clear, the majority explained, 
by asserting in the statute that a public performance occurs “whether the 
members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive 
it . . . at the same time or at different times.”95  In this regard, the Court not-
ed, Congress specifically sought to overturn two prior Supreme Court opin-
ions in which the Court refused to hold cable operators liable for violating 
the public performance rights of broadcasters under the old statute.96  In the 
1976 statute, the majority continued, Congress sought to impose liability on 
operators as well as subscribers for performing work—that cable operators 
were not merely making equipment available to viewers, but also impermis-
sibly transmitting signals to viewers.97 
Accordingly, the Court explained, since Aereo “performs” broadcast 
programs “publicly” in the same way that cable operators do, it is bound by 
the same provisions of the Copyright Act—that is, neither Aereo nor any 
other online video distributors like it may retransmit broadcast signals 
without broadcasters’ authorization.98 
The majority limited the scope of its holding in the face of concerns 
from amici and others that a decision against Aereo might also impose un-
intended restrictions on cloud computing services generally.99  The distinc-
tion between the online video distribution at issue and other internet-based 
services was not hard to make: unlike the latter, the majority explained, 
Aereo’s subscribers do not have any proprietary interest in the underlying 
works that Aereo makes available.100  The Transmit Clause “does not ex-
tend to those who act as owners or possessors of the relevant product”; it 
could only be addressed to “cable companies and their equivalents.”101  
                                                          
 92.  Id. at 2508. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 2509. 
 95.  Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96.  Id. at 2505–06. 
 97.  Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5676). 
 98.  Id. at 2511. 
 99.  Id. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 100.  Id. at 2510 (majority opinion). 
 101.  Id. 
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This means that, at a minimum, the provision covers entities that “com-
municate[] . . . contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds” of a 
work in the same way that cable providers do.102  In any event, the majority 
observed, the fair use doctrine provides a fail-safe mechanism against “in-
appropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause.”103 
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion that Justices Thomas and 
Alito joined.  In it, he rejected the majority’s conclusion that Aereo could 
directly infringe on broadcasters’ performance rights if subscribers, not 
Aereo, trigger the transmission of the underlying work.104  The right ques-
tion, he argued, was instead about the scope of secondary liability, not di-
rect liability.105  This is an important distinction, Justice Scalia explained, 
because Aereo does not engage in volitional conduct.106  Its “automated, us-
er-controlled system,” he continued, places the decisive volitional conduct 
in the hands of the subscriber.107  Aereo, for its part, Justice Scalia conclud-
ed, does not have the requisite amount of intentionality to be directly liable 
for direct infringement.108  He reasoned that it “does not ‘perform’ for the 
sole and simple reason that it does not make the choice of content.”109  This 
is far different, he noted, than the cable services that gave rise to the Trans-
mit Clause in 1976.110  Those services, Justice Scalia explained, actively de-
fined the video content they supplied to subscribers.111 
In the end, Justice Scalia reserved his most caustic criticism for the 
majority’s “guilt by resemblance” approach to copyright law.112  Among 
other things, he observed, the House Report to which the majority only cit-
ed once could not be reflective of congressional intent at the time.113  In any 
event, he explained, the majority’s decision to turn “performance” on a “ca-
ble-TV-lookalike rule” does not provide much clarity for other online video 
distribution services.114 
                                                          
 102.  Id. at 2509. 
 103.  Id. at 2511. 
 104.  Id. at 2512–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105.  Id. at 2514. 
 106.  Id. at 2512–13. 
 107.  Id. at 2513. 
 108.  Id. at 2514. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 2515. 
 111.  Id. at 2515–16. 
 112.  Id. at 2515–17. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 2516.  Justice Scalia posited that the “cable-TV-lookalike rule” as such would not 
resolve whether a record-and-playback service like that offered by Aereo (but not on review on 
appeal) infringes on broadcasters’ public performance right.  Id. at 2516–17.  Under current law, 
however, that sort of “time shifting” would likely be a permissible fair use.  The majority seemed 
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D.  Agency Work (or, What the Aereo Opinions Did Not Mention) 
The authors of the majority and dissenting opinions reached their con-
clusions in the absence of any clear precedent on the question of how 
broadly the public performance right reaches.  Justice Breyer thought it was 
important to identify and make sense of the Transmit Clause’s general leg-
islative purpose in the context of the new technology.115  He wondered 
whether Aereo’s service was much different from cable, and concluded that 
it was not.116  It did not matter that online video streaming was unknown to 
lawmakers in 1976.  He just presumed that, under the Copyright Act, users 
must have an underlying relationship with the work in question in order to 
avoid liability under the Transmit Clause, although no court has ever re-
quired as much. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, on the other hand, was characteristically dis-
missive of the use of legislative history as a methodology for interpreting 
the meaning of the Transmit Clause.117  He determined that the semantic 
meaning of the operative verb in the Transmit Clause—“perform”—
required a volitional act on the part of the alleged infringer even though, not 
unlike the majority opinion, the Supreme Court has never adverted as 
much.118 
In this regard, the Breyer and Scalia opinions in Aereo were just the 
latest installments in the longstanding feud between the two about judicial 
interpretive approach.  They were both unwaveringly confident in their au-
thority to make legal sense of the new technology without consultation of 
anything more than the statute and their own interpretive methodology.119 
This preoccupation was put in full relief in the Aereo case because 
federal agencies—that is, important institutional interpreters of public law 
other than courts—have over the past decade or so sought to clarify how to 
treat online video distributors under the Copyright Act or the Communica-
tions Act.  The Copyright Office, as I explain in more detail in Part III be-
low, has for over the past decade repeatedly observed that online video dis-
                                                          
to agree as much with this point.  Accord id. at 2511 (majority opinion) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
 115.  Id. at 2502–10. 
 116.  Id. at 2507.  Courts have often felt compelled to make analogies to conventional commu-
nications technologies in order to make legal sense of the internet.  This has the unfortunate effect 
of underappreciating the novel particularities of the specific online service or application at issue. 
 117.  Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(referring to “the severe shortcomings” of reliance on 
legislative history as an “interpretive methodology”). 
 118.  But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be 
some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used 
to create a copy by a third party.”). 
 119.  See supra Part I.C.  
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tributors are not “cable systems” within the meaning of Section 111 of the 
Copyright Act, the sister provision of the Transmit Clause.  Those agency 
decisions clearly are at odds or at least inconsistent with the majority’s de-
cision in Aereo.  The FCC for its part has been administering a proceeding 
on whether online video distributors owe the same duties to broadcasters 
that cable operators and other multichannel video programming distributors 
(“MVPDs”) do.  As with their silence on the Copyright Office’s implemen-
tation of Section 111, the Justices’ omission of these proceedings borders 
on remarkable.  The Justices’ silence on the role that these agencies have 
been playing since the advent of the online video distribution is all the more 
notable in light of the fact that both Justices Breyer and Scalia are former 
scholars and teachers of administrative law. 
To put the matter more starkly: neither Aereo opinion gave any con-
sideration to whether the courts are the right or best institutions for deciding 
how to treat online video streaming in the face of so much agency work on 
the matter.  The Justices took for granted that they are.  And, as it goes, they 
were not alone.  None of the other trial or appellate courts to hear the cases 
against Aereo or FilmOn before the Supreme Court’s decision last summer 
gave any meaningful consideration (never mind deference) to agency ac-
tions on the matter.120 
My argument here is that courts should, as a matter of course, attend to 
the agencies that Congress set in motion in the Copyright Act and the 
Communications Act.  Courts and information law scholars have attended 
to the relative institutional roles that legislatures, agencies, and courts play 
                                                          
 120.  See supra Part I.B.  After the Supreme Court decision, Aereo sought to amend its plead-
ings to allege that it qualified for a compulsory license under Section 111.  Joint Letter of Parties 
at 3 (July 9, 2014) (No. 12-cv-1540), available at http://blog.aereo.com/2014/07/3784/.  In the 
litigation that led to the Supreme Court decision, Aereo had argued that it could not qualify as a 
cable system.  The company thought it could invoke the provision as an affirmative defense to 
broadcasters’ motion for an injunction, particularly after the Supreme Court held that Aereo is like 
a cable system for the purposes of the Transmit Clause.  It argued that, if they are a cable system 
under the Copyright Act, they are entitled to the benefits of the statutory license under 111(c).  It 
accordingly filed statements of account and royalty fees with the Copyright Office.  The agency 
promptly rejected the request.  “[I]nternet retransmissions of broadcast television,” it explained, 
“fall outside the scope of the Section 111 license.”  Letter from General Counsel and Associate 
Register of Copyrights, Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, United States Copyright Office, to Matthew 
Calabro, Aereo, Inc. (July 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_Copyright_Office_letter.pdf.  The 
company filed for bankruptcy soon afterward.  Tanya Agrawal & Jonathan Stempel, Video 
streaming service Aereo files for bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-aereo-bankruptcy-idUSKCN0J513K20141121.  In 
spite of this filing, broadcasters continue to prosecute their substantive infringement claim.  See 
Broadcasters’ Motion for Relief from Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) and Memorandum of 
Law, In re Aereo, Inc., Case No. 14-13200 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), available at 
http://ia601409.us.archive.org/12/items/gov.uscourts.nysb.254268/gov.uscourts.nysb.254268.47.0.
pdf.   
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in resolving disputes arising from disruptive networked communications 
technologies in a variety of other substantive legislative fields.121  No one, 
however, has done so for the public performance right.  To the extent legal 
commentators have written about the online video streaming cases, they fo-
cus on what the right substantive policy ought to be; they ask whether 
courts have struck the proper balance between content owners, innovators, 
and the public.122 
That this has been the narrow focus of scholarship is no surprise.  The 
preoccupation with finding the best positive substantive outcome (irrespec-
tive of legal process and governance) is the staple of information law schol-
arship.  The most enduring (and celebrated) law review article in the area 
argued that policymakers ought to promulgate more than statutory prohibi-
tions because today’s software writers and computer engineers are demon-
strably too wily to be daunted by them.123  Legislators and policymakers, 
this scholar argued, ought to implement “soft” forms of regulation that fos-
ter innovation.124 
But, today, over three decades since its commercialization, the Internet 
is far more than an innovation machine that policymakers must regulate del-
icately.125  Today, as is quite evident in the growth of the market for online 
video, the Internet is now fully integrated into public life.  At least for now, 
the transmission protocol on which the Internet is based is the dominant 
means of distributing information.126  Parties are now more than ever asking 
courts to resolve high-stakes communication technology disputes in a varie-
                                                          
 121.  See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 9; Fetzer & Yoo, supra note 9; Freiwald, 
supra note 9; Kerr, supra note 9; Mazzone, supra note 9; Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 9; 
Solove, supra note 9.   
 122.  See, e.g., Novak, supra note 8; Rasenberger & Pepe, supra note 8, at, 641–43. 
 123.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 513–14 (1999); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formula-
tion of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998) 
(“[L]aw and government regulation are not the only source of rulemaking.  Technological capabil-
ities and system design choices impose rules on participants.  The creation and implementation of 
information policy are embedded in network designs and standards as well as in system configura-
tions.”). 
 124.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 175 (2006) (“Code can, and increasingly will, displace law 
as the primary defense of intellectual property in cyberspace.  Private fences, not public law.”); 
see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 184 (1999); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, supra note 123, at 554–55. 
 125.  Cf. Sylvain, supra note 10. 
 126.  See, e.g., Order, Technology Transitions, 29 FCC Rcd. 1433 (2014) (ordering experimen-
tation for the transition from traditional time-division multiplexed circuit-switched voice services 
to an Internet protocol based voice service). 
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ty of settings presumably because there is no obvious answer to what the 
proper policy balance ought to be.127 
The overwhelming focus on substantive policy outcomes ignores the 
far more pertinent question today of how courts ought to make legal sense 
of laws when technologies change and prevailing public law objectives are 
in tension.  These are difficult questions to answer.  They are all the trickier 
for judges when sophisticated and well-resourced public interest groups, 
trade associations, and transnational conglomerates bring to bear their own 
interests to the question. 
Congress delegated first-instance policymaking authority to the Copy-
right Office and the FCC precisely for these reasons.  Courts accordingly 
have deferred to those agencies (under Chevron, for example) for the same 
reasons.128  This is why the Aereo opinions are so remarkable; the Justices 
evinced no awareness of this background. 
The Aereo case accordingly provides an opportunity to consider the 
ways in which courts might develop a more careful approach to making le-
gal sense of disruptive technologies when statutes are ambiguous.  I outline 
in Part III what such an approach would look like.  In short, I argue that 
courts ought to determine at the outset, before deciding the substantive 
question, whether the agencies that Congress has charged with filling in 
gaps in video distribution law have addressed or are in the process of ad-
dressing the matter.129  Before setting out the contours of this proposal, 
however, I show in Part II below that the Copyright Office and the FCC 
have, indeed, been very active in the legislative field of video distribution 
for decades. 
II.  VIDEO DISTRIBUTION LAW IN FOCUS 
Contemporary legal disputes involving novel communications tech-
nologies generally arise from disagreements between individual users, en-
trepreneurs, and engineers over the meaning or scope of existing public law.  
It is no surprise that new technologies could trigger such heated, high-
stakes disagreement.  The original language and purpose of laws concerning 
                                                          
 127.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Viacom Int’l v. Youtube, Inc., 
676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 128.  City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, , 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (applying Chevron deference 
to the FCC’s rulemaking on cellphone tower siting provision in the Communications Act); WPIX, 
Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279-85 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying Chevron and Skidmore deference 
to Copyright Office’s findings regarding §111 of the Copyright Act).  See generally GOLDSTEIN 
ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.20, n.7 (3d Edition 2005) (observing that, while “[c]ircuits divide on the def-
erence to be given to the Copyright Office[,] . . . some courts give so-called ‘Chevron defer-
ence’”). 
 129.  See infra Part III.C. 
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networked communications were not designed to address modern-day reali-
ties. 
Courts employ different interpretive strategies to resolve such disputes 
depending on the nature of the particular statutory provision at issue and in 
consideration of the applicable institutional constraints.  On the one hand, 
they might take it upon themselves to resolve a matter in the first instance 
without consulting anyone else.  Or, on the other hand, they might consult 
or defer to other institutions (i.e., administrative agencies) on the assump-
tion that the latter are better suited to resolving such disputes in the first in-
stance than courts are. 
But, in Aereo, the Supreme Court did not evince any awareness that 
they had a choice in the matter.  Neither the majority nor the dissent gave a 
moment’s consideration to whether it (or any federal courts) should defer to 
or even consider the work of the Copyright Office or the Federal Commu-
nications Commission on video distribution law.130  They presumably be-
lieved that it was their responsibility to resolve the contest between broad-
casters and the developers of online video distribution applications, in spite 
of the regulatory regimes that Congress created solely for that purpose.  To 
give some context for this glaringly immodest view of their relative institu-
tional role, here, in this Part, I outline the public law that they ignored. 
A.  The History and Political Economy of Video Distribution 
Broadcast radio and television have played an important role in defin-
ing American public life for several decades now.  But Congress enshrined 
the political economy of broadcast distribution in the Radio Act of 1927, 
and then the Communications Act of 1934.131  In both, broadcasters were to 
be the vital trustees of the public airwaves.  A station could only obtain a 
license to use a frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum if it could 
demonstrate to the FCC (and the Federal Radio Commission before it) that 
it would act in the public interest.132 
This regulatory arrangement was the backdrop for the advertising-
based broadcast network system of the twentieth century.  The major broad-
cast networks entered into exclusive agreements with local station affiliates 
across the country to distribute original programming.  The networks and 
their affiliates supported this system by selling time during the airing of 
their programs to advertisers.  Audience size translated into revenue; the 
bigger and more captive the audience, the greater the revenue to broadcast-
ers. 
                                                          
 130.  See supra Part I.C. 
 131.  See Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162; Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064. 
 132.  See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
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The popularity of programming was therefore essential to the flow of 
revenue.  The major studios did everything they could to keep audiences 
coming back for more.  Daytime programming was important, of course.  
But, in this scheme, the most lucrative airtime was (and, for broadcasters, 
still is) in the evening: primetime, after people had come home from work 
and eaten dinner. 
American viewers generally abided by this schedule, organizing their 
waking lives around weekly listings in TV Guide and the local newspaper.  
Television was the great electronic hearth by which viewers, together, en-
thusiastically basked in a shared American culture.  Anchormen like Walter 
Cronkite supplied reassurance during difficult times.  Popular episodic 
comedies like The Honeymooners and I Love Lucy made fun and sense of 
the times.  The American public experienced primetime television in one 
sitting as a single community.  Of course, there were minorities, outliers, 
and dissenters who did not follow mainstream television programming.133  
For the most part, however, broadcast television was an important galvaniz-
ing force in American life.134 
The Internet and online video in particular have dramatically redefined 
the way in which viewers interact and watch video programming.135  Of 
course, broadcast television programming continues to play an important 
part in American popular culture today.  Just ask the contestants on Danc-
ing with the Stars or any one of the Real Housewives.  But it does not occu-
py the defining position in the culture that it once did.  The key difference is 
that viewers more than ever watch video content on their laptops and mo-
bile phones at the time of their choosing.136  At a minimum, the attraction of 
live or prime time television as such is not as salient to young adult view-
ers.137 
To be clear, online streaming of broadcast programming has existed 
for only a little more than a decade.138  It still comprises a small fraction of 
                                                          
 133.  Olivier Sylvain, Contingency and the “Networked Information Economy”: A Critique of 
The Wealth of Networks, 4 INT’L J. TECH., KNOWLEDGE & SOC’Y 203 (2008). 
 134.  Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1982). 
 135.  See Tim Wu, Netflix’s War on Mass Culture, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115687/netflixs-war-mass-culture. 
 136.  See generally Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the De-
livery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4406–09 (2009) (discussing Slingbox and other 
technological innovations). 
 137.  NIELSEN COMPANY & THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE, OUT OF HOME 
TELEVISION AND OTHER VIDEO VIEWING BEHAVIORS OF U.S. ADULTS: RESULTS FROM THE 
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE VIDEO CONSUMER MAPPING STUDY (2010). 
 138.  See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (finding for broadcasters in suit challenging web-based transmission of 
U.S. over-the-air programs to viewers in the United States via a Canadian website). 
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TV viewing today.139  But so much more seems to be at stake today, as the 
number of online video viewers will continue to increase in the coming 
years.140 
The popularity of online video content has grown so much over just 
the past decade or so that it is now cutting into markets long dominated by 
broadcasters.  Companies like Hulu, Amazon, and Netflix have for the past 
seven or so years supplied internet-enabled platforms for streaming episodic 
shows and feature films.  In the past two years, they have developed their 
own critically acclaimed original episodic programs like House of Cards 
and Orange is the New Black and feature films like Mitt.141  And, of course, 
YouTube and Vimeo provide internet-based platforms for user-generated 
video content.  Cable programmers like HBO, too, are now getting in the 
game, promising to deliver their premium content to online streamers who 
do not subscribe to cable.142 
Online streaming of broadcast programming poses one of the biggest 
threats to the traditional political economy of video production and distribu-
tion.  It is no wonder that Nielsen, the audience measurement firm, now in-
cludes mobile devices in its analysis of TV audiences.143  News, moreover, 
that Comcast, the cable television giant, entered a special “peering” ar-
rangement with Netflix earlier this year to manage the latter’s high band-
width traffic to users portends quite a fundamental restructuring of the vid-
eo distribution market.144 
                                                          
 139.  Alex Kantrowitz, Are Advertisers Spending Too Much on Online Video?, ADVERTISING 
AGE (Sept. 11, 2013), http://adage.com/article/digital/nielsen-online-video-consumption-tiny-
compared-tv/244084/. 
 140.  Associated Press, Cord Cutting a Trend? Nielsen to Begin Counting Online Streaming, 
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cord-cutting-a-trend-nielsen-to-begin-
counting-online-streaming/. 
 141.  Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., con-
curring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are ill-suited to a 
marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”). 
 142.  Issie Lapowsky, Down with Cable! Why HBO Is Finally Launching a Standalone Stream-
ing Service, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/hbo-streaming-
service/?mbid=social_twitter. 
 143.  Todd Spangler, Nielsen to Add Mobile Device Viewing to TV Ratings in Fall 2014, 
VARIETY (Sept. 19, 2013), http://variety.com/2013/tv/news/nielsen-to-add-mobile-device-
viewing-to-tv-ratings-in-fall-2014-1200649185/. 
 144.  Steven Musil, Netflix Reaches Streaming Traffic Agreement with Comcast, CNET (Feb. 
23, 2014), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57619353-93/netflix-reaches-streaming-traffic-
agreement-with-comcast/.  This announcement came on the heels of other news that, pending reg-
ulatory approval, Comcast, the largest cable operator in the country, will acquire Time Warner 
Cable, the second largest cable operator in the country.  Michael Santoli, Comcast and Time 
Warner Cable Merger: What It Means for Consumers, YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2014), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/comcast-to-acquire-time-warner-cable-
143000745.html.  
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Broadcasters today are eager to find, and jealously guard, viewers 
where they can.  And they are invoking all of the legal protections available 
to them to ward off emergent networked communications companies.145 
What are courts to do now that the traditional model for distributing 
premium video is being inverted by a technology that enables individual us-
ers to control where, when, and on what device they watch content?  The 
courts to which the question was posed in the cases involving Aereo and 
FilmOn were divided about the scope of the public performance right and 
its application to these new forms of video distribution—that is, until the 
Supreme Court decided the matter this past summer.  Their uncertainty was 
no surprise.  On the one hand, the language in the Transmit Clause recog-
nizes that transmissions that are delivered to different places at different 
times could still be performed publicly within the meaning of the statute.  
But the law was also conceived at a time when video distribution was most-
ly comprised of simultaneous transmissions of live and episodic network 
programs.  They were public in the colloquial sense; broadcast television 
articulated shared cultural and political priorities that were experienced con-
temporaneously by all viewers.  Today, online video subscribers trigger the 
“performance” of broadcast programs with a click or tap of their networked 
device.  In light of the great variety of video programming now available, it 
makes little sense to refer to the public in the same sense as broadcast law 
posits, at least because “performances” are experienced in a far more frac-
tured and diffuse way than they were just a generation ago. 
B.  Agencies and the Public Law of Video Distribution Today 
The Copyright Act and the Transmit Clause memorialized a hard-
fought, decades-long legislative settlement concerning powerful interests in 
the market for video distribution.  Congress enacted the public performance 
right under Section 106 and the corollary compulsory licensing regime in 
order to settle the conflict between broadcasters and cable operators.  In the 
four decades since, Congress has incrementally reformed this regime to ac-
count for new video distribution technologies as they have emerged.146 
                                                          
 145.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 255989 
(W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding for broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the public perfor-
mance of copyrighted programming framed with advertisements obtained by defendants from To-
ronto to computer users in the United States); see also WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (holding that an internet-based video streaming site is not a “cable system” within the 
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 111, the compulsory licensing provisions of the Copyright Act).  I use the 
term “emergent” or “novel” networked communications throughout to denote the category of 
technologies that, while extant and available to users, have not yet been the subject of legal analy-
sis or interpretation by courts. 
 146.  See, e.g., Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (Title I of the Intellectual 
Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999), 47 U.S.C. §§ 335–338 (2012). 
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But the Copyright Act does not comprehensively cover the field.  
Congress also has amended the Communications Act consistently since its 
enactment in 1934 to define the legal obligations and entitlements of the va-
riety of extant stakeholders in the field of broadcast and video distribution.  
Congress, for example, substantially revised the law governing the retrans-
mission of broadcast programming in 1992 in two ways.  First, Congress 
required cable and direct broadcast satellite service (“DBS”) providers to 
carry certain broadcast programming.  Second, Congress created for broad-
casters a new statutory right to veto cable operators’ unauthorized retrans-
mission of broadcast content.147  These two provisions—must-carry and re-
transmission consent—were to work in tandem to improve broadcasters’ 
market position vis-à-vis cable operators.  These changes to the Communi-
cations Act adopted the approach that the FCC had employed for decades 
before.  Congress, moreover, was explicitly mindful that these reforms to 
the Communications Act would interact with the public performance right 
and the compulsory license regime in the Copyright Act.148 
In this vein, the 1992 Communications Act amendments fill out a leg-
islative field of which the public performance right is just one very small 
piece.  I show here that the combined history of the public performance 
right, the compulsory licensing regime, must-carry regulation, retransmis-
sion consent, as well as program access paints the picture of a legal field 
that is determined above all by legislation and regulation rather than judge-
made law.  At every critical juncture in the evolution of the market for vid-
eo distribution, Congress, the Copyright Office, and the FCC have been the 
decisive policymaking bodies, filling in gaps and ambiguities of the govern-
ing statutes when novel technologies emerge and the general market cir-
cumstances change over time.  This Part sets up my argument in Part III 
that courts are misguided when they take it upon themselves to elaborate 
any single feature of this regime with barely a whisper about this regulatory 
context. 
1.  The Copyright Act 
a.  Public Performance and the Statutory License 
Before 1976, cable operators did not seek the permission of local sta-
tions to retransmit broadcast programming.  Broadcasters were perfectly 
content with this arrangement.  They did not really see cable service as a 
                                                          
 147.  Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460; see iCraveTV, 2000 WL 255989 (holding for 
broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the public performance of copyrighted program-
ming framed with advertisements obtained by defendants from Toronto to computer users in the 
United States). 
 148.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1) (explicitly referring to 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2012)). 
Sylvain Final Proof  
742 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:715 
threat.  To the contrary, they believed that cable operators could, at best, 
marginally expand viewership.149  They understood cable television to be 
more charity than market disruption. 
At least in its early years, it arguably was.  The cooperatives and early 
operators of what was then called “community antenna television” retrans-
mitted broadcast signals to members and potential viewers who, for a varie-
ty of reasons, could not otherwise receive clear signals.150  Their main ob-
jective was not to compete with broadcasters.  They used large antennas as 
well as signaling and amplification technologies to receive over-the-air 
broadcast signals that they would otherwise not be able to get.151  Opera-
tives retransmitted those signals by cable (or microwave) to interested 
neighbors’ televisions.152 
It was only as cable service became more popular in the 1960s that 
broadcasters grew concerned.153  Under the advertising-based network-
affiliate model of broadcast programming distribution, local stations paid 
for network content on the condition that they would be the exclusive pur-
veyors of the content in that given local market.154  Local stations could 
count on monetizing local advertisers’ interest in reaching local audiences.  
While they welcomed national advertising, each station cultivated an exclu-
sive relationship with a major broadcast network in order to attract local ad-
vertisers.155  Since local advertisers had no real interest in reaching distant 
markets, a station’s decision to enter into an exclusive agreement with a 
major network was a simple exercise in arithmetic. 
Cable television unsettled this arrangement.  A local cable operator re-
duced broadcasters’ ability to measure the size of their respective local au-
dience for their programming.156  This was a clear threat for a business 
model that depended as heavily as it did (and still does) on the ability to 
measure and collect data about audiences. 
                                                          
 149.  See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION 
OR COMPETITION 2 (1996).  During this period, moreover, the FCC chose not to regulate cable 
retransmission.  See Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV 
“Satellite” Stations, and TV “Repeaters” on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 
26 F.C.C. 403, 431 (1959) (“[W]e find no present basis for asserting jurisdiction or authority over 
CATV’s . . . .”). 
 150.  Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1968).   
 151.  See generally Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 827 (2012). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d. 348 (9th Cir. 1964). 
 154.  ERIK BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1933–1953 (1968). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  MARY ALICE & MAYER PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA 
TELEVISION 42 (1972); MARTIN H. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA 
TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 44 (1965). 
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By the sixties, cable television matured into a line of business for 
which viewers were showing a willingness to pay a fee.  By the 1970s, ca-
ble operators also began to develop their own programs.  As such, cable 
was disrupting the whole political economy of broadcast distribution.157 
Broadcasters in particular grew concerned that cable operators were 
monetizing their original programming without permission or compensa-
tion.  They accordingly brought suits against cable operators, alleging that 
they were, among other things, infringing on their exclusive right to “per-
form” dramatic works publicly for profit under the 1909 Copyright Act.158 
The Supreme Court rejected broadcasters’ claims in two opinions by 
Justice Potter Stewart.  In Fortnightly v. United Artists159 in 1968 and Tele-
prompter v. Columbia Broadcasting System160 in 1974, the Court held that 
community access television did not infringe on broadcasters’ public per-
formance rights under the 1909 Copyright Act.161  Retransmission by cable, 
the Court concluded in Fortnightly, was not a public performance within 
the meaning of the 1909 law because “the basic function” of the amplifica-
tion technologies at issue is not unlike anything that the ordinary broadcast 
television viewer can do to receive a signal on her own.162  CATV coopera-
tives and commercial operators in this sense are “passive beneficiar[ies]” of 
broadcasters’ performances; they are not the purveyors of programming as 
such.163 
The Court in Teleprompter applied this holding to cable operators that 
imported distant (that is, not local) broadcast signals into local markets, in-
terconnected with other area CATV systems, originated their own video 
content, and sold advertising.164  Those operators, it explained, also do not 
perform within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act.165  First, the Court 
reasoned, it made no difference under the 1909 Act that cable operators had 
become entrepreneurial if there was still no “nexus” between these new fea-
tures and the broadcast content that they retransmitted.166  Second, the 
Court rejected the argument that cable operators transformed into perform-
ers within the meaning of the 1909 law when they began importing distant 
signals into local areas that would otherwise not receive them. This impor-
tation function, the Court explained, does not change the nature of cable 
                                                          
 157.  See Sylvain, supra note 151 at 827–28. 
 158.  See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968). 
 159.  392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
 160.  415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
 161.  Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–02; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405. 
 162.  Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399. 
 163.  Id. at 398–99. 
 164.  Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408. 
 165.  Id. at 410–12. 
 166.  Id. at 405. 
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service because, as in systems that retransmit local signals to local audienc-
es, it remains a wholly “viewer function.”167  Broadcasters, it explained, 
send their programs out to the public to be received and watched.  Cable 
operators simply make that content available to viewers.168  The Court was 
also not particularly taken by the argument that cable television upsets the 
political economy of the advertising-based system of broadcasting.  Cable 
operators, Justice Stewart observed, only expand broadcasters’ potential 
viewer market, and only really affect their relationship with advertisers.169 
Having failed in the courts, broadcasters appealed to Congress.170  
There, they found a more hospitable forum.  This is not to say that Congress 
obliged their every request; it did not.  Rather, the legislative process, more 
than litigation, was far more conducive to resolving the variety of policy 
concerns—concerns involving competition, the distribution of free pro-
gramming, and the protection of local broadcasters. 
Legislators, moreover, were already inclined to reform the existing 
copyright law.  Indeed, by the 1950s, legislators already were considering 
ways to update the 1909 Act.171  By the 1960s, many of the reforms that 
would appear in the 1976 statute had already been “hammered out.”172  In-
deed, as early as 1966, members of the House were circulating a version of 
a provision that resembles the enacted provision we now call the Transmit 
Clause.173  The report that accompanied the provision at this early stage ob-
served, moreover, that the provision was addressed to transmissions that are 
“capable of reaching different recipients at different times, as in the case of 
sounds or images stored in an information system and capable of being per-
formed or displayed at the initiative of individual members of the pub-
lic.”174  The report made this observation to explain the last clauses of the 
Transmit Clause addressed to time and place.175 
                                                          
 167.  Id. at 408. 
 168.  Id. at 408–09. 
 169.  Id. at 411–13. 
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ute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 31 (2011) (“Congress set out to update 
the 1909 Copyright Act at various points during the first half of the twentieth century without suc-
cess.”). 
 172.  Id. at 32. 
 173.  Compare H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 57–58 (1966) (defining “transmit” and “public” un-
der proposed Copyright Act revisions), with 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (defining “publicly” in the 
Transmit Clause). 
 174.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 58. 
 175.  Id.  The congressional report’s description appears to describe the Aereo design.  See su-
pra Part I.A.  But, to be clear, it does not address individuated recording applications like Aereo’s 
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The steady emergence of cable television and the Fortnightly and Tel-
eprompter litigation complicated this legislative work.  In those cases, the 
Court gave cable operators more leverage than they had before the opinions 
were announced.  This is what the 1976 Act sought to resolve.  As I ex-
plained above, in the Transmit Clause, Congress explicitly overturned the 
holdings in these Supreme Court cases.176 
Importantly, Congress also set out a compulsory licensing scheme 
through which “cable systems” would have to pay a statutorily defined fee 
under Section 111.177  That provision provides that: 
secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a per-
formance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmis-
sion made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Com-
munications Commission . . . shall be subject to statutory 
licensing upon compliance with the requirements of subsection 
(d) where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary 
transmission is permissible under the rules, regulations, or author-
izations of the Federal Communications Commission.178 
Section 111 defines a cable system in pertinent part as “a facility” that “re-
ceives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more television 
broadcast stations licensed by the [FCC], and makes secondary transmis-
sions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other 
communications channels to subscribing members of the public who pay 
for such service.”179  This legislative arrangement allowed cable operators 
to continue to retransmit without having to concern themselves with the 
“transaction costs associated with marketplace negotiations for the carriage 
of copyrighted programs.”180  Under this scheme, however, cable operators 
would have to pay broadcasters in order to retransmit their programming to 
cable subscribers.181 
                                                          
or FilmOn’s.  At most, the report raises questions about the Second Circuit’s analysis of the 
Transmit Clause in the Cablevision case, where the defendant cable operator stored broadcast con-
tent in its single “information system” and retransmitted those signals “at the initiative of individ-
ual members of the public.”  Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 90-83 at 29 (1967)).  
 176.  See supra text accompanying notes 94–98. 
 177.  17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining public performance: to wit, “to transmit or otherwise com-
municate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or pro-
cess, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it 
in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times”); Id. § 111 (cre-
ating compulsory licensing regime for retransmission of broadcast programming by a cable sys-
tem). 
 178.  Id. § 111(c)(1). 
 179.  Id. § 111(f)(3). 
 180.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 3. 
 181.  See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d).  Some broadcasters today would like to see the compulsory li-
censing regime discontinued.  See JOHN BERGMAYER, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE COMPULSORY 
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Congress settled on these terms with the specific political economy of 
cable retransmission of broadcasting programming in mind.  There was 
nothing inevitable or objectively optimal about the balance that it struck.  
The impetus for legislative intervention was simply that cable service had 
become a viable player in the broadcast television market.  Congress set out 
“[l]imitations on exclusive rights” to retransmit “broadcast programming by 
cable.”182 
One can go further and conclude, as the Second Circuit did in Aereo, 
that when Congress drafted the Transmit Clause, it did not intend to confer 
a sweeping protection to content creators for all time.  Rather, legislators 
redressed the controversy known to them at the time, explicitly settling on 
“a series of detailed and complex provisions which attempt to resolve the 
question of the copyright liability of cable television systems.”183  There 
was “no simple answer to the cable-copyright controversy,” the House Re-
port on the bill explained.184  Congress was simply doing the best it could to 
find a balanced approach to the existing market for video programming.  In 
this way, Congress moderated the specific extant interests.  Had it sought to 
account for any possible iteration of video distribution, it could have said 
so.185 
b.  The Copyright Office 
But Congress did more than define the relative entitlements and duties 
of broadcasters and cable operators.  Under Section 111, it also delegated to 
the Copyright Office the responsibility of administering the licensing re-
gime and,186 as I show here, refining the balance of interests as communica-
tions technologies change and new technologies emerge. 
The statute prescribes the conditions under which cable providers may 
obtain a compulsory license to retransmit copyright works.  The agency’s 
role is, on the one hand, quite mundane: it must elaborate the form and con-
tent of filings by providers for the purposes of administering compulsory 
licensing filings and facilitating payments.187  This authority is not unlike 
the role the agency plays in the administration of licensing for the distribu-
                                                          
COPYRIGHT LICENSES 1, 4 (2011), 
http://siliconflatirons.com/documents/publications/report/CompulsoryCopyrightLicenses.pdf. 
 182.  17 U.S.C. § 111 (describing title of section). 
 183.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Compare id., with Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101(5), 72 Stat. 
731, 737 (defining “aircraft” broadly to include “any contrivance now known or hereafter invent-
ed, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in the air”) (emphasis added). 
 186.  17 U.S.C. § 111(d). 
 187.  See 37 C.F.R. § 201.17 (2000). 
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tion of phonorecords of nondramatic musical works as well as the distribu-
tion of digital audio under Section 114.188 
The agency’s authority, however, extends far beyond the simple minis-
terial implementation of licensing regimes.  Consider the Register of Copy-
right’s responsibility to advise Congress and agencies during the considera-
tion of amendments or in light of new developments in the market.189  In 
this capacity, the agency has been integral to Congress’s enactment of copy-
right-related legislation for decades, including the period before the 1976 
Act and before passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998 
(“DMCA”).190  Courts, moreover, are required to seek out the expertise of 
the Copyright Office in cases in which the accuracy of information in a 
copyright registration statement is contested.191 
The Copyright Office also plays the important role of defining positive 
entitlements and duties as changes in communications technologies render 
the statutory language more ambiguous over time.  They take such action 
through interpretive and legislative rulemakings.  And courts routinely de-
fer to the agency’s interpretation of provisions of the Copyright Act at times 
of dramatic technological change.192  They have reasoned that Congress in-
tended the Copyright Office to be the “administrative overseer” of the li-
censing regime under Section 111 in particular because of the characteristic 
dynamism of the market for communications technologies at issue in that 
statute.193  No other entity in the federal government is more equipped to 
measure disruptive communication technologies against the terms of the 
Copyright Act than the Copyright Office. 
Importantly, courts, too, have recognized as much.  In 2012, a year be-
fore it issued its opinion in the Aereo case, the Second Circuit heard an ap-
peal in which ivi, a company that provided web-based video streaming to 
users, sought a declaratory judgment that it is a “cable system” within the 
                                                          
 188.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2 )& (f).   
 189.  See id. § 701(b)(1)–(2). 
 190.  See, e.g., 144 Cong. REC. 24468 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Patrick Leahy re-
ferring to the “recommendations and hard work of the Copyright Office” in developing the 
DMCA). 
 191.  See 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) (“In any case in which inaccurate information . . . is alleged, 
the court shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the inaccurate infor-
mation, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.”). 
 192.  See Cablevision v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 609 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1956)). 
 193.  Id. at 608; cf. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 771–72 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (deferring to the Copyright Office’s interpretation of exemption under Section 114 pursuant 
to Chevron; explaining that “the Copyright Office could not exercise its duties and functions 
without the ability to interpret” the applicable statutory language in the context of new and evolv-
ing technologies).  See generally 17 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
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meaning of Section 111.194  With that designation, ivi would be entitled to 
retransmit broadcast signals as long as it pays the statutory fee for the bene-
fit.195  The Second Circuit rejected the claim, agreeing with broadcasters 
that the compulsory licensing provision under Section 111 does not “extend 
to Internet transmissions.”196 
The panel also turned to the Copyright Office’s conclusions on the 
matter to get a better sense of “Congress’s intent.”197  It did so even though 
the agency was not a party to the litigation.  Rather, the Copyright Office 
had published reports to Congress in which it repeatedly concluded that In-
ternet transmissions do not count as a “cable system” within the meaning of 
the compulsory licensing regime under Section 111.198  Indeed, in reports 
and testimony to Congress from late 1997 to 2011, the agency had deter-
mined consistently that internet streaming is not sufficiently like cable tele-
vision service to be subject to the compulsory licensing provision.199  Citing 
Chevron, the Second Circuit deferred to the Copyright Office’s assess-
ment.200  The agency’s conclusion, the panel held, was reasonable and not 
otherwise barred by the statute.201  I will return to this case in Part III be-
low. 
2.  The Communications Act 
The Copyright Act is not the only statute through which Congress leg-
islates in the field of video distribution.  When it amended the Communica-
tions Act in 1992, Congress set out an even more elaborate regime.  Among 
other things, through that statute, Congress has tasked the FCC with admin-
istering a system for awarding licenses to broadcasters and rules that govern 
the markets for video distribution and programming. 
With this authority, the FCC has had a major, if not decisive, role in 
making legal sense of novel video distribution technologies that were not 
known to lawmakers in 1934, when Congress first enacted the statute.  For 
example, as cable television emerged in valley towns across the country in 
the late 1940s and 1950s,202 the agency relied on the Communications Act 
to bar cable providers from importing distant broadcast signals into local 
                                                          
 194.  WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277–79 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 195.  See id. at 278–79. 
 196.  Id. at 282. 
 197.  Id. at 282–83. 
 198.  Id. at 283 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 188; U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, SATELLITE TELEVISION EXTENSION AND LOCALISM ACT § 302 REPORT 48 (2011)). 
 199.  Id. (citing, inter alia, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING 
REGIMES COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 97 (1997)).  
 200.  Id. at 284–85. 
 201.  Id. at 284.  
 202.  Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827. 
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markets.203  Congress ratified the FCC’s general regulatory approach in 
1992 amendments to the Communications Act.204  It did so fully mindful of 
the public performance right and the statutory licensing regime in the Copy-
right Act; it observed that the new provisions modify neither “the compul-
sory copyright license established in section 111” nor “existing or future 
video programming licensing agreements between broadcasting stations and 
video programmers.”205  The 1992 statutory amendments reformed the 1976 
Act specifically to redress the remarkable shift in market definition caused 
by the real explosion of cable television in the 1980s. 
Today, the Communications Act and the FCC’s implementation of it 
embody the greater part of video distribution law.  The FCC, however, has 
yet to speak definitively about how provisions of the Communications Act 
apply to internet-based video distribution in the way the Copyright Office 
has.206  In this subpart, however, I detail the steps the FCC has taken in this 
regard to underscore the extensive scope of existing public law in this area.  
I argue that courts should routinely incorporate, or at least acknowledge in 
their analyses of the current generation of video streaming cases, this ex-
pansive regulatory arrangement. 
a.  Retransmission Consent and Must-Carry 
From the late-1940s to the mid-1960s, the FCC chose to impose a reg-
ulatory light touch on the new cable operator upstarts that were emerging 
across the country.  The common view then was that “community antenna 
television,” as it was called, supplemented broadcasting by relaying signals 
to low-lying valley communities.207  It did not matter that the new video 
distribution technology complicated the network-affiliate broadcast model 
of video distribution.  The presumption (now, understood as a conceit) was 
that broadcasting could never really be displaced by the upstarts.  Broad-
casters in this early period did not have any doubt about their importance as 
public trustees of the airwaves. 
By the mid-1960s, however, as cable service spread, the common wis-
dom changed.  Cable was clearly becoming more than a supplement to 
broadcasting; it had become a gatekeeper to many local markets and a po-
                                                          
 203.  Id. at 829. 
 204.  47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) (2012) (“No cable system or other multichannel video program-
ming distributor shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station . . . .”). 
 205.  Id. § 325(b)(6); see also 17 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) (“[T]he secondary transmission to the 
public of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission is actionable as 
an act of infringement.”). 
 206.  See supra notes 186–201 and accompanying text. 
 207.  See Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827. 
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tential competitor on video programming itself.  It was displacing the cen-
trality of broadcasting. 
The FCC responded by promulgating rules that required cable opera-
tors to obtain the agreement of local stations to carry signals to subscribers 
in the local market.208  The agency also imposed pricing regulations on ca-
ble operators on the theory that they could abuse their new gatekeeping po-
sition in local markets by charging subscribers unreasonably high rates.209  
Cable companies of course resisted these changes on the grounds that the 
FCC did not have the statutory authority to regulate them—that they were 
not broadcasters within the meaning of the Communications Act.210  The 
agency had argued that it could regulate cable service because it is ancillary 
to a service it otherwise has the authority to regulate—broadcasting.211  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the agency’s interpretation.212 
In 1984, a little more than a decade and a half later, Congress lifted 
these FCC regulations in local areas where there was “effective competi-
tion.”  The FCC subsequently defined this term broadly, allowing cable 
providers to operate in most local markets free from price regulation.  The 
consequence of the 1984 amendment and its implementation by the FCC 
was a decade of high subscriber rates for cable service.213 
By the early 1990s, as consumer worries about the rate of increase in 
cable prices intensified, broadcasters and consumer groups agitated for 
more protective legislation.  They set their sights on an amendment to the 
Communications Act that would effectively enlarge broadcasters’ leverage 
vis-à-vis cable operators and other “multichannel video programming dis-
tributors” (“MVPDs”).214  The common view was that cable providers, 
                                                          
 208.  See, e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17 (1962) (denying 
transmitter permit application); Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to 
Relay TV Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., No. 14895, Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic 
Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations Used to Relay TV Broad. 
Signals to Cmty. Antenna TV Sys., No. 15233, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 796–97 (1966) (adopting rules 
and regulations).  See generally LELAND JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE 
TELEVISION (1994); Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination 
of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 99, 102 (1996). 
 209.  See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).  
 210.  See id. at 172. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  See id. at 181. 
 213.  See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (“Since rate deregulation, monthly rates for the lowest 
priced basic cable service have increased by 40 percent or more for 28 percent of cable television 
subscribers.  . . . The average monthly cable rate has increased almost 3 times as much as the Con-
sumer Price Index since rate deregulation.”). 
 214.  Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 305, 336-37 (1993). 
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who, unlike broadcasters, had no positive responsibility to attend to the 
public interest, were drowning out free, over-the-air programming.215 
This push for reform succeeded.  Legislators came to believe that, in 
spite of the 1976 compromise, broadcasters were airing content with dis-
proportionately little benefit in return.216  Cable operators now controlled 
access to local markets and reaped all of the advantages of the content that 
broadcasters were supplying.  This, according to the Senate Committee Re-
port on the bill that eventually became the new law, unsettled the very 
foundation of over-the-air broadcasting.217  Free video programming, the 
Report explained, should never be “replaced by a system which requires 
consumers to pay for television service.”218  The new law would give 
broadcasters a new entitlement that they could use as leverage in negotia-
tions with MVPDs over retransmission terms.  Among other things, for ex-
ample, broadcasters and other content providers could negotiate to add new 
channels that providers would otherwise not carry.219 
Among other things, the Cable Television Consumer and Competition 
Act of 1992 requires cable operators to carry local broadcasters’ signals to 
local audiences if the local station elects to forgo negotiating on retransmis-
sion consent terms.220  Under the new law, moreover, cable operators can-
not receive compensation for carrying local broadcast signals when a local 
broadcaster elects to be a must-carry station.221  If, however, a broadcaster 
                                                          
 215.  Id. at 335. 
 216.  S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 35 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168 (observ-
ing that “the Committee . . . does not believe that public policy supports a system under which 
broadcasters in effect subsidize the establishment of their chief competitors.”); see also Federal 
Communications Commission, Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, 8 FCC Rcd. 2965, 3004–05 (1993) (determining that the 1992 Cable 
Act “created a new communications right in the broadcaster’s signal, completely separate from 
the programming contained in the signal.” (emphasis added)). 
 217.  S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168. 
 218.  Id. at 30, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169. 
 219.  Id. at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1168–69; see also 138 CONG. REC. S642-
01 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye) (“S. 12 permits the two interested 
parties—the station and the cable system—to negotiate concerning their mutual interests.  It is of 
course in their mutual interests that these parties reach an agreement.”). 
 220.  Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 6; 47 U.S.C. 
§ 325(b)(1)(B) (2012) (retransmission consent provision which also creates exception for must-
carry provision at 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2012)).  The must-carry provisions essentially require cable 
service providers to carry a minimum number of broadcast signals based on the relative size of the 
local market.  47 U.S.C. § 534(a).   
 221.  47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(10).  There are a variety of reasons that would compel a broadcaster 
to elect must-carry over retransmission consent.  See generally CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, 
RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND OTHER FEDERAL RULES AFFECTING PROGRAMMER-
DISTRIBUTOR NEGOTIATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
REPORT RL34078(2007), available at http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-
crs-reports/RL34078.pdf.  
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elects to proceed under the retransmission consent regime, cable television 
providers must settle on retransmission terms with broadcasters.  In the ab-
sence of an agreement, the prior may not retransmit the latter’s signal.  In-
deed, they must remove that broadcaster’s signal from their offerings and, 
moreover, may not import the distant signal of another affiliate within the 
same network. 
Crucially, this must-carry requirement rests on the popular faith (and, 
now, fiction) that “television broadcasting plays a vital role in serving the 
public interest.”222  The Supreme Court later ratified this view when, in re-
sponse to a First Amendment challenge by cable operators, it held that the 
must-carry provisions are content-neutral and justified by a legitimate gov-
ernment interest in providing free, over-the-air public interest programming 
to consumers.223  Congress, the Court explained, decided that pay television 
could never displace this model. 
Of course, in today’s market, this account about free, over-the-air 
broadcasting is more romance than reality, as fewer people every year rely 
on television antennas to watch broadcast programs.224  Most viewers sub-
scribe to cable or use their internet connection to watch programming at a 
time and place that is convenient.225 
In any event, Congress found broadcasting important enough to renew 
the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions in 1999 and expanded 
them to cover direct broadcast satellite providers.226  The result is that, to-
day, broadcasters are assured that cable operators and satellite providers 
will carry their signal.  In this regard, the 1992 Act has done precisely what 
its proponents hoped; it has given broadcasters more leverage in their nego-
tiations with MVPDs. 
These new entitlements, however, have introduced an important new 
wrinkle in the political economy of video distribution.  Ever since 1992, 
                                                          
 222.  S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1174. 
 223.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997). 
 224.  See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 17071, 17072 (proposed Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) (“Since Congress 
enacted the retransmission consent regime in 1992, there have been significant changes in the vid-
eo programming marketplace.”).  But see Emily Steel, After Supreme Court Ruling, Aereo’s Rivals 
in TV Streaming Seize Opening, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/business/media/after-supreme-court-ruling-aereos-rivals-in-
tv-streaming-seize-opening.html. 
 225.  Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., con-
curring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are ill-suited to a 
marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”).  
 226.  See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(5)(A) (2012) (defining the term “provider of direct broadcast sat-
ellite service”); id. §§ 338, 614 (2012); see also Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 
(Title I of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999), Pub. L. 
No. 106-113, Appendix I, § 1009(a), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-537–38.   
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broadcasters and other video content producers have routinely held-up pop-
ular time-sensitive programming (like major professional sports events) 
when it comes time to negotiate new retransmission terms.227  They do so to 
extract additional commitments from operators, including the promise to 
carry new or unpopular channels or to pay more per-subscriber fees for the 
channels they do carry.228 
Recognizing this moral hazard, in 1999 amendments to the Communi-
cations Act, Congress required the FCC to ensure that broadcasters negoti-
ate with cable and satellite providers in good faith.229  Congress later im-
posed the “good faith” obligation on the cable operators and broadcasters a 
few years later.  The agency has yet to use this authority, however, to pro-
tect subscribers from the game of chicken that broadcasters play with cable 
operators whenever retransmission terms are up for renewal.  Congress is 
considering an array of reforms in light of the lack of action from the FCC 
on the “good faith” provision.  The Video CHOICE (Consumers Have Op-
tions in Choosing Entertainment) Act, for example, would put an end to 
broadcast networks’ blackouts during contract negotiations over retransmis-
sion terms.230  This proposed bill would also forbid broadcasters from lev-
eraging their popular networks to force cable operators to carry affiliated 
but less popular cable networks.231 
b.  Program Access 
Must-carry and retransmission consent represented significant reforms 
to video distribution law.  Like the public performance right and the statuto-
ry license, however, they comprise only a fraction of the whole public law 
in the legislative field of video distribution.  Congress in 1992 also amend-
ed the Communications Act to prohibit MVPDs from “engag[ing] in unfair 
                                                          
 227.  See, e.g., Ted Johnson, DirecTV Refuses to ‘Bail Out’ Time Warner Cable in Dodgers 
Standoff, VARIETY (July 29, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/tv/news/dodgers-tv-standoff-time-
warner-cable-says-yes-to-arbitration-but-directv-doesnt-bite-1201270994/; Chloe Albanesius, Ca-
blevision Sues Viacom Over Channel Bundling, PC MAGAZINE (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2415967,00.asp.  
 228.  See, e.g., Albanesius, supra note 227; David Wharton, PGA Championship faces CBS 
blackout for Time Warner Cable customers, LA TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-pga-championship-cbs-television-blackout-
20130807,0,7602876.story#axzz2bNyTEHFj.  
 229.  47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C)(ii).   
 230.  H.R. 3719, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Joe Flint, Proposed Bills Seek to Rewrite Media 
Rulebook, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-proposed-bills-media-rules-
20131212,0,2826769.story#axzz2nIXEN9ut. 
 231.  Another bill, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, would reform retransmis-
sion consent and compulsory licensing rules.  H.R. 3720, 113th Cong. (2013).  Cf. Alex Ben 
Block, “Two Bills Introduced in Congress to Stem TV Blackouts,” HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 
12, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/two-bills-introduced-congress-stem-665429. 
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methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”232  The 
statute further requires the FCC to implement program access regulations 
that elaborate on this restriction.233 
Of course, as the statute was drafted in the early 1990s, it is not clear 
whether Congress meant to include online video distributors within the 
scope of the statute.  The statute defines an MVPD as: 
a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a multi-
channel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite 
service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor, 
who makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, 
multiple channels of video programming.234 
While the list in the definition is helpful, it is only illustrative; it is not ex-
haustive of covered providers.  It therefore leaves the legal obligations 
owed by and to the variety of emergent online video providers today in le-
gal limbo, at least for now. 
The difficulty in the statute is in its reference to “channels.”  The ques-
tion is whether  online video providers supply “multiple channels of video 
programming” in the same way that cable providers do within the meaning 
of the Communications Act?235  The FCC has had the occasion to answer 
the question in the context of a dispute arising out of a video programmer’s 
decision to prematurely terminate its licensing arrangement with Sky An-
gel, an operator of a subscription service that distributes the content of tele-
vision networks in real time to televisions equipped with internet-connected 
set-top boxes.236  The agency has tentatively rejected Sky Angel’s com-
plaint about the termination, explaining that, based on the evidence before 
                                                          
 232.  47 U.S.C. § 548(b). 
 233.  Id. § 548(c).  See generally 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1998), (FCC rules governing competitive 
access to cable programming). 
 234.  47 U.S.C. § 522; see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(e) (defining MVPD as “an entity engaged 
in the business of making available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels 
of video programming”). 
 235.  See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13).  Most notable among the newest generation of upstarts is Sky 
Angel, an operator of a subscription service that distributes the content of television networks in 
real time to televisions equipped with internet-connected set-top boxes.  The company enters into 
contracts with broadcasters and other video content producers like Discovery and Disney, for ex-
ample, to supply content to its subscribers who, in turn, can watch the programming on their tele-
vision as it hits the airwaves.  In this way, Sky Angel provides a service that is similar to that of 
traditional cable operators.  The significant difference is that, even while their subscribers watch 
the programs on high-definition televisions, Sky Angel transmits the programming to subscribers 
over the Internet. 
 236.  Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879, 3880 ¶ 4, 3883 ¶ 7 (2010) (emergency petition 
for temporary standstill).  The video programmer involved in the dispute, Discovery Holding 
Company, qualifies as a competitor MVPD because its owner has a significant stake in such com-
panies.  See News Corp., 23 FCC Rcd. 3265, 3273 ¶ 12 (2008) (noting the stakes of Discovery’s 
officers and directors in a competing MVPD, Liberty Media Corporation).   
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it, “Sky Angel does not provide its subscribers with a transmission path,” as 
the agency has interpreted the word.237  But the agency’s conclusion, again, 
was tentative; it was only replying to Sky Angel’s request for a “temporary 
standstill” of the arrangement between it and Discovery, the content provid-
er involved in the dispute.  The FCC has yet to enter a final order in the 
case. 
This is no surprise.  The language of the statute is not clear.  Nor, as in 
Aereo, is it clear what the correct answer ought to be as a matter of law.  In-
deed, since the dispute raises novel questions about a disruptive technology 
that the pertinent statute and regulations could not anticipate, the FCC in 
2012 opened a proceeding in which it invited public comment on the scope 
of the program access rules.238  That proceeding and the adjudication that 
instigated it remain open today, to the frustration of Sky Angel, which re-
cently had to suspend its video distribution services.239  There is little ques-
tion that there are substantial competition concerns at stake.240  But, again, 
it is not at all evident in the language of the statute or pertinent regulations 
how these disputes ought to be resolved as a matter of existing law.  All 
eyes now are on the FCC to resolve the question. 
All of this work deserves far more consideration than courts were will-
ing to give it in the public performance cases.  It is one thing to ask courts 
to be more respectful, and another to determine how they should implement 
that deference as a matter of course.  I take up that challenge in Part III be-
low. 
III. DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE 
As I show above, in Part II, the task of determining whether unlicensed 
online video streaming of free, over-the-air broadcast programming infring-
es on broadcasters’ public performance rights is complicated.  It cannot be 
done well simply by examining the plain text or specific legislative history 
of the Transmit Clause.  The pertinent statutes are like pieces of a 1,000-
piece jigsaw puzzle.  Each piece furthers a specific objective that comple-
ments the others.241  Putting the pieces together, however, requires 
                                                          
 237.  Sky Angel, 25 FCC Rcd. at 3883 ¶ 7. 
 238.  Media Bureau, 27 FCC Rcd. 3079, 3082 ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2012) (notice). 
 239.  See Supplemental Comments of Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Nos. 12-80 & 12-83, (F.C.C. June 
10, 2014), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521313509. 
 240.  Consider that Sky Angel has brought antitrust claims against other video programmers 
who have also prematurely terminated their arrangements with the online video provider.  The 
D.C. Circuit dismissed Sky Angel’s claim against the National Cable Satellite Corporation for 
pulling C-SPAN from its lineup, but only because Sky Angel did not plead sufficient facts to es-
tablish “concerted action,” not because the motivating concerns were not anticompetitive.  See 
Sky Angel v. Nat’l Cable Satellite Corp., 947 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 241.  See supra Part II.B. 
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knowledge of where the others fit.  Congress gave to the Copyright Office 
and the FCC the assignment of making sense of these various pieces when 
new technologies emerge. 
In the recent cases involving Aereo and FilmOn, however, federal 
judges did not convey anything but unwavering confidence in their institu-
tional capacity and authority to determine the scope of the Transmit 
Clause.242  The courts interpreted the provision, unbothered by the various 
provisions and agency interpretations that bear on the question. 
In this Part, I propose that judges be far more mindful of their institu-
tional authority and capacity than they have been in this setting.  Scholars 
have studied the relative roles that courts, legislators, and agencies play 
when reviewing controversies across substantive areas associated with net-
worked information technologies.  They have not, however, directed the 
same attention to defining the courts’ authority or capacity to resolve dis-
putes as complex and agency-involving as video distribution.  This Part rec-
tifies this silence by drawing on principles in administrative law doctrine. 
A.  Judicial Deference Generally 
There are two basic reasons for deference in judicial interpretation of 
public law.  First, courts consider deferring when they assume that there is a 
nontrivial risk that they might make a mistake about the substantive issue in 
dispute.  Even if their epistemic error can later be cured, their intervention 
could be destabilizing in the interim.  Accordingly, a court will defer if it 
also believes that another institution (that is, a legislature, an agency, or 
standard-setting organization) has a greater institutional capacity or exper-
tise to make the right decisions in the given subject matter.  Thus, A will 
elect to abide by B’s prior conclusion on the same question even though A 
might have resolved the issue differently in the first instance.243  Implicit in 
this conception is the recognition that A always has the freedom to decide 
whether it should defer to the prior decision by B, but that B is far likelier to 
get it right in the first instance.244 
The second reason for deference is institutional.  Deference in these 
cases is an explicit recognition that certain institutions are by design respon-
sible for enacting a limited range of laws or rules in the first instance.  This 
means A will defer to B because the former is A and the latter is B.245  It 
                                                          
 242.  See supra Part I.D. 
 243.  See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072 
(2008). 
 244.  See id. at 1075. 
 245.  See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We have 
long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s con-
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does not matter whether B is, from A’s perspective, right or wrong as a sub-
stantive matter.246 
Separation of powers and democratic legitimacy are constitutional 
principles that impose formal limits on judges’ authority to make legal deci-
sions irrespective of what the best substantive resolution is.247  The concept 
of separation of powers associates each of the branches of government with 
a specific and mutually exclusive role in federal governance.  This structur-
al arrangement reflects the negotiated balance reached during the founding 
period as well as a more general view of how constitutional democracies 
ought to function.248 
Democratic legitimacy, on the other hand, requires constituencies to 
validate the public laws by which they must abide.  Under this conception, 
the elected branches are presumed to be superior to courts at resolving con-
tested policy questions.249  They are accountable to, and representatives of, 
defined constituencies.250  At least theoretically, elections are the mecha-
nisms through which elected officials stay in tune with constituents’ inter-
ests.  Federal courts, on the other hand, have no such constituencies and, as 
a result, no obligation to heed majoritarian demands on substantive out-
comes.  Independent agencies are generally sheltered from the vagaries of 
electoral politics, but not as removed (or antimajoritarian) as courts are by 
design.  They, like elected officials, are better able to “set[] the dimensions 
of social policy that may involve trades among the interests of broad group-
ings of citizens,” while “judges’ strengths lie in resolving discrete contro-
versies between individuals, in which one wins, another loses, and broad 
social adjustments are secondary to the outcome of their concrete dis-
pute.”251 
The doctrine of judicial review of agency action in administrative law 
embodies these two background constitutional norms: separation of powers 
and democratic legitimacy.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council252 stands as the principle statement on 
these two norms.  Under the Chevron doctrine, judges defer to agencies’ 
                                                          
struction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to ad-
ministrative interpretations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 246.  See id. at 845. 
 247.  Id. at 842–45. 
 248.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629–30 (1952) (Douglas, J., 
concurring); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 143–44, 150, 
159 (Simon & Brown 2012) (1690). 
 249.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Adminis-
trative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1257 (1992). 
 252.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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substantive implementation of ambiguous statutes on the assumption that 
the agency officials who have been thinking longest and most systematical-
ly about the given problem are likely to have the most prudent policy solu-
tion.253  To be sure, courts will reject the agency action when it conflicts 
with congressional intent.254  But courts will defer to an agency’s judgment 
if they find that the agency action at issue reasonably accommodates com-
peting interests, “the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agen-
cy considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the deci-
sion involves reconciling conflicting policies.”255  These elements are 
characteristic of the work that many agencies undertake.  It is presumably 
for this reason that judicial reversals of agency action under Chevron are 
much less frequent than judicial affirmation.256 
Public choice critiques have not diminished Congress’s continued del-
egation to agencies and courts’ concomitant deference to agency action.257  
To the contrary, Congress continues to delegate a wide range of responsibil-
ities to agencies; agencies, in turn, have developed a variety of regulatory 
tools to implement legislative priorities.258  Among other things, agency of-
ficials collect information about fields as they change, report on those find-
ings to legislators and other policymakers, and adapt laws to changing cir-
cumstances.  Agencies are generally well-equipped to undertake these 
responsibilities in spite of concerns about regulatory capture and self-
dealing.259 
Courts accordingly honor the various forms through which agencies 
implement public law by deferring, or at least respecting, the latter’s efforts 
as a matter of course.  That is, courts have not adopted a one-size-fits-all re-
gime of deference after Chevron.  Instead, they tailor their scrutiny of agen-
cy action to each case and legislative field.  Under current doctrine, the lev-
el of deference courts give to agencies falls somewhere along a spectrum or 
                                                          
 253.  Id. at 865–66. 
 254.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634–35 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 255.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted). 
 256.  Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 696 n.91 
(2007). 
 257.  See, e.g., City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013) (holding that 
courts must defer under Chevron to an agency’s determination that it has jurisdiction to interpret 
an ambiguous statute).  See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010). 
 258.  See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001) (discussing when Chevron def-
erence applies). 
 259.  See Barkow, supra note 257. 
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“continuum.”260  The level of deference given depends on the agency action 
under scrutiny, the specific statutory authority on which the agency bases 
its action, and the relative or unique institutional expertise the agency has 
brought to bear.261  On one end of this spectrum, there are cases in which 
courts ignore, are indifferent to, or are altogether skeptical about the agen-
cy’s interpretations generally.  These are cases where Congress has unam-
biguously decided not to confer lawmaking authority to an agency or where 
courts have traditionally assumed the authority to decide this kind of dis-
pute in the first instance.262  In these cases, courts apply a “pragmatic, mul-
ti-factored methodology” that considers “statutory text and the whole act; 
legislative history and statutory purpose; the evolution of the statute 
through judicial and other precedents; and substantive policy canons.”263  
At the other end are cases involving a statute through which Congress has 
delegated primary and nearly exclusive lawmaking authority to an agency.  
In these latter cases, courts assume a far more deferential posture.264  But 
the amount of deference a court gives to an agency can vary widely, from 
“consultative” to “super deference,” depending on the nature of the authori-
ty at issue.265 
In the context of video distribution, Congress delegated specific au-
thority to the Copyright Office and FCC.  These agencies are tasked with 
calibrating the implementation of the Copyright Act and the Communica-
tions Act, respectively, as new and unanticipated technologies emerge.  
Over the years, Congress has given these agencies broad authority to make 
legal sense of new technologies in the first instance.  I outline those duties 
here, based on my account in Part II. 
Reporting.  Both agencies are explicitly charged with the task of col-
lecting information from stakeholders about the state of affairs in video dis-
tribution.  That is, they collect information about prevalent market uses, 
consumer habits, judicial interpretations, and emergent technologies.  They 
play this role, again, because there is only so much that Congress can do in 
this legislative field.  In any event, agencies are far better equipped and 
staffed to collect such information.  But Congress also has charged both 
agencies with the responsibility of reporting their findings to legislators, 
                                                          
 260.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1089–90 (2008).   
 261.  Id. at 228. 
 262.  See infra Part III.B (discussing electronic surveillance). 
 263.  See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1117.  
 264.  See infra Part III.B (discussing broadband network management). 
 265.  See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1098–99. 
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other federal agencies, and, on request, to courts.  This role is precisely the 
sort of task an agent for Congress should undertake.266 
Adapting Current Laws.  Both agencies also have the authority to 
promulgate rules and offer guidance on substantive questions when the 
governing statute is ambiguous or unclear.  They do this in ways that Con-
gress, as a practical matter, simply cannot.  Above, in Part II, I discussed at 
least two examples that showcase this important feature of their responsibil-
ities administration: first, the FCC’s rulemakings addressed to cable opera-
tors and broadcasters in the 1960s and, second, the Copyright Office’s con-
sistent determination over the course of the past decade and a half that in-
internet transmissions are not included in the compulsory licensing regime.  
In both cases, the agencies promulgated a rule or interpretation to fill a leg-
islative gap until Congress formally amends the old statute or enacts a new 
one to resolve a substantive ambiguity occasioned by the emergence of a 
disruptive new video distribution technology like online streaming. 
Convening.  Hand-in-hand with the responsibility of collecting infor-
mation is the important role both agencies have in convening discussions 
and negotiations between the various stakeholders in the field.  Congress 
has given to the FCC in particular broad authority to arbitrate or mediate 
disputes.  In this capacity, the FCC is best positioned to understand the rela-
tive priorities of service providers, consumer advocacy groups, and tech-
nologists.  The FCC’s rulemaking proceedings also operate as opportunities 
for the various stakeholders to convene formally.  The agency, in turn, re-
lies on the exchange of ideas to formulate policy that is presumably reflec-
tive of the various rival interests. 
Expertise.  Finally, over the years, the Copyright Office and the FCC 
have developed a uniquely deep understanding of the nature of communica-
tion markets.  The FCC in particular has lawyers, economists, and technol-
ogists on staff to elucidate new developments and trends.  The Copyright 
Office, on the other hand, operates as a convener, a research arm for Con-
gress, and an administrator for licensing regimes across substantive areas.  
Both agencies have acquired this deep level of knowledge in ways that ex-
ceed anything close to what Congress or the courts have. 
Together, these various activities paint a picture of broad responsibil-
ity.  Over time, Congress has actively chosen to give the Copyright Office 
and the FCC substantial power to make sense of new communications tech-
nologies as they emerge.  Because Congress has given the FCC and the 
                                                          
 266.  While the Copyright Office has the responsibility to report to Congress and the courts on 
copyright related matters, it is a subordinate agency within the Library of Congress.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).  The current Register of Copyrights and her predecessor are on record as 
advocating the restructuring of the Copyright Office as an independent agency.  See Letter of Ma-
ria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, to Representative John Conyers, Jr. (Mar. 23, 2015). 
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Copyright Office these powers, courts have accordingly afforded deference 
to those agencies on the scope of video distribution law. 
B.  Judicial Deference and Communication Technologies 
Institutional authority and capacity are not the only justifications for 
judicial deference.  Different substantive areas warrant different kinds of 
expertise.  In the context of copyright law, courts are reluctant to expand 
existing copyright protections to novel communication technologies “with-
out explicit legislative guidance.”267  The Supreme Court affirmed this prin-
ciple in Sony v. Universal City Studios.268  In Sony, it found that manufac-
turers of videocassette recorders are not secondarily liable for viewers’ re-
reproduction of copyright protected television programs.269  It determined 
that users generally record those programs for their personal use (that is, 
they “time-shift”).270  The Court held that these “substantial noninfringing 
uses” do not cause the requisite level of harm to the copyright owners.271 
The Sony Court explained that judges are generally less capable of 
“accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of competing interests that 
are inevitably implicated by such new technology” than Congress is.272  It 
cited the well-established view “that the protection given to copyrights is 
wholly statutory.”273  The Court noted that this is why courts have been re-
luctant “to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit 
legislative guidance.”274 
The 1976 Copyright Act itself is evidence of this interaction between 
courts and Congress.  The Sony Court cited Teleprompter and Fortnightly, 
both overturned by the Act, as cases that triggered a legislative fix to the 
statutory public performance right.275  Courts accordingly, the Sony Court 
noted, must err on the side of caution before broadening protections.  
“Sound policy, as well as history,” the Court explained, “supports our con-
sistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter 
                                                          
 267.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (citing, inter alia, 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) and Fortnightly Corp. v. Unit-
ed Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v.  Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 965 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 431). 
 268.  464 U.S. 417, 446–47. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. at 449–50. 
 271.  Id. at 456. 
 272.  Id. at 431.  
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Id. (citing, inter alia, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) 
and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)). 
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the market for copyrighted materials.”276  It asserted as much even as the 
fair use analysis is characteristically fact-intensive and best suited to adjudi-
cation.277 
But, to be sure, the reasoning in Sony is not what most students of ad-
ministrative law generally associate with the idea of deference.  As I out-
lined above, deference, at least as it comes up in administrative law doc-
trine, refers to the posture courts assume when Congress has charged an 
agency with interpreting or implementing the statutory regime at issue in a 
case.  Sony was not about that kind of deference.  The dispute in Sony con-
cerned a question—the scope of the fair use defense278—that courts have 
assumed the responsibility of resolving in the first instance.279  But it was 
during the course of its fair use analysis that the Court explicitly second-
guessed its own capacity and institutional authority to stretch the law to ap-
ply to the new technology at issue.280  It expressed this reticence as defer-
ence to Congress. 
That same principle should have applied in the cases involving Aereo 
and FilmOn, but it did not.  Indeed, after reading Aereo, one might think 
that courts need not be so deferential to Congress or agencies generally 
when they adjudicate disputes involving novel communication technolo-
gies.  In their opinions, neither Justice Breyer nor Justice Scalia for a sec-
ond considered whether the Court was the right forum to decide in the first 
instance whether the Transmit Clause reaches online video streaming—a 
technology that was unknown to most people until just a few years ago.281  
Their assumption was that courts have the authority to and are capable of 
                                                          
 276.  Id.; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer, 
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cases that a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’ should be made by democratically 
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 277.  See Monge v. Maya Magazines, 688 F.3d 1164, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing Fol-
som v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass 1841)).  The fact-specific nature of the fair 
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ON COPYRIGHT § 12.1 (2013); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. 
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 279.  But see Mazzone, supra note 9, at 414–15. 
 280.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent def-
erence to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materi-
als.  Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully 
the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technol-
ogy.”). 
 281.  See supra Part I.D. 
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resolving such disputes by simply examining no more than the statutory 
provision in dispute. 
This proposition sounds right for two reasons.  First, Congress has not 
delegated to any agency the authority to implement the Transmit Clause in 
the way it has delegated administrative authority to implement other statu-
tory provisions like, for example, Section 111 of the Copyright Act.  Sec-
ond, courts cannot abdicate their positive responsibility of adjudicating dis-
putes brought before them.  At a minimum, they must resolve whether a 
case is justiciable in the first place.  They must decide, for example, wheth-
er there is a ripe controversy worthy of their attention or whether they have 
jurisdiction to hear the matter.  They cannot defer those questions to any 
other institution. 
More generally, courts routinely decide how to interpret contested 
terms without consulting other institutions.  They decide which resources or 
kinds of authorities are worth considering and following.  Courts decide, for 
example, whether and to what extent legislative history or other evidence of 
congressional intent matters when determining the scope of a substantive 
right or obligation.282  They do this as a matter of interpretive judicial phi-
losophy ex ante283 or because, pursuant to the statutory provision at issue, 
they must consider certain legislative factors in their analysis.284  Or they 
decide that they should review certain agency actions in a certain way.285  
That is, pursuant to their native duty to say what the law is, they devise 
standards of judicial review and deference to account for constitutional or 
institutional considerations unmentioned in the legislation at issue.286 
We might assume that it is with this background in mind that the 
courts in the cases involving Aereo and FilmOn appeared to have taken it as 
an article of faith that they could and should decide what Congress meant 
by including the term “publicly” in the definition of performance in the 
Transmit Clause.  But the decision about how to interpret contested terms is 
not as obvious or unimportant as the Aereo opinions’ silence on the matter 
suggests.  In cases involving disruptive networked communications tech-
                                                          
 282.  Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011) (“Those of us who make use 
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nologies generally, courts routinely convey humility, or at least self-
awareness, about the limits of their institutional authority or capacity.   
Much more recently, courts have done this in cases involving issues as 
disparate as electronic communication surveillance by law enforcement of-
ficials on the one hand, and broadband network management practices of 
internet service providers on the other.  As to electronic surveillance, courts 
have not hesitated to say in the first instance what the Fourth Amendment 
allows.287  Yet, even in this area, the Supreme Court has wrung its hands 
demonstrably about whether it or Congress is better suited to defining the 
scope of privacy protection in cases involving technologically novel sur-
veillance techniques.288  They do this notwithstanding their uncontroverted 
exclusive authority to interpret constitutional provisions.289  They even have 
invited Congress to provide guidance on how to define privacy in recent 
cases involving surveillance techniques that rely on novel networked com-
munications technologies like location tracking.290  And, yet, at the same 
time, courts have recognized that they are at the peak of their institutional 
authority when they are asked to resolve disputes about the substantive 
scope of a constitutional right.  Outside of a narrow range of statutes 
through which Congress has delegated policymaking authority to federal 
law enforcement officials to define the contours of statutory privacy 
rights,291 agencies do not have an articulated responsibility to define the 
scope of protection from electronic surveillance under the Fourth Amend-
ment.292 
The governance of local internet service providers, on the other hand, 
is very different from the governance of law enforcement surveillance tech-
niques.  Importantly, local broadband network management is not a consti-
tutional matter.  As technologies change, the FCC implements the objec-
tives set out in the Communications Act through a wide range of regulatory 
                                                          
 287.  See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–
35 (2001).  
 288.  See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).   
 289.  See Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of To-
tal Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 512–14 (2014). 
 290.  See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[C]oncern about new intrusions 
on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.”).  Justice 
Alito flatly observed in his concurring opinion in Jones that, “in circumstances involving dramatic 
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”  Id. at 964. 
 291.  See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). 
 292.  Of course, this is not to say that agencies do not have some rulemaking authority on pri-
vacy law outside of law enforcement surveillance.  See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005). 
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activities.293  Nevertheless, the federal courts have not hesitated to define or 
reflect on the obligations of internet service providers under the Communi-
cations Act.294  They have done so, however, within the bounds of transsub-
stantive deference doctrines and administrative law doctrine generally.295  
Courts have decided that the agencies to which Congress has delegated au-
thority are best situated to interpret the pertinent statutory terms. 
As to both areas, electronic surveillance and broadband network man-
agement, courts are always explicitly mindful of the limits of their relative 
institutional authority and capacity.  Scholars of these two areas in particu-
lar, too, have attended to the courts’ relative institutional role.296 
C.  Towards a Theory of Implied Delegation in Video Distribution Law 
1.  Deference in Action 
Should we treat the Transmit Clause as a provision that courts have the 
exclusive responsibility of elaborating in the first instance (like the Fourth 
Amendment)?297  Or is it more like a provision in a regulatory regime that a 
federal agency has the delegated authority to administer (like that set out in 
the Communications Act)?  Or does it fit somewhere in between?   
Chevron does not really answer those questions, but another canonical 
Supreme Court case in modern administrative law doctrine provides im-
portant guidance.  In United States v. Mead,298 the Supreme Court identified 
the various considerations that judges must generally take into account 
when deciding whether to defer or what level of deference courts should 
give to agencies.299  The Mead Court held that courts must inquire into how 
                                                          
 293.  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 157, 1302(a) (2012); see also id. § 201(b) (authorizing the 
agency to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry 
out” provisions of the statute). 
 294.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 
600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 295.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–84, 991 
(2005) (applying Chevron to agency interpretation of definitional terms in Communications Act); 
cf. City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870–72 (2013) (applying Chevron to agen-
cy interpretation of jurisdictional provision). 
 296.  See generally Kerr, supra note 9; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2013); Sylvain, supra note 151, at 795; Olivier Sylvain, Internet Gov-
ernance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 205, 259–61 (2010). 
 297.  To be sure, the Copyright Clause in the Constitution does not engage courts in the way 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does.  The latter enlists courts to measure executive 
overreach.  The former, on the other hand, explicitly authorizes Congress to “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts” by setting “limits” on creators’ exclusive rights to their copyrighted 
works.  U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  But that structural difference went unnoticed in the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Aereo. 
 298.  533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 299.  Id. at 227–34. 
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and whether Congress intended to delegate to the Customs Office the au-
thority to implement the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
before scrutinizing the validity of the agency’s action.300  If a court finds no 
such intention, then it will be less deferential than required under Chev-
ron.301  Courts only have to consider “the thoroughness” of the agency’s 
analysis, “the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.”302 
After Mead, one of the key questions for federal courts is whether 
Congress has one way or another delegated to the agency at issue the au-
thority to interpret and administer an ambiguous provision with the “force 
of law.”303  Deference—whether obedience or simply weighty considera-
tion—will depend on whether the agency’s interpretation is “made in pur-
suance of official duty” and premised on “more specialized experience and 
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a 
particular case.”304 
This inquiry, sometimes called Chevron Step Zero,305 must come be-
fore the reviewing court analyzes the substantive merits of the agency ac-
tion at issue.  The Court in Mead explained that an agency can manifest its 
expertise in a “great variety of ways.”306  Depending on what the governing 
statute allows, an agency may manifest congressional intent by rulemaking, 
adjudication, enforcement, or any other number of methods.307  Courts, 
meanwhile, must be prepared to honor “the spectrum of possible agency ac-
tion” that Congress has permitted.308  Deference, the Court explained, must 
be “tailor[ed]” to the variety of forms that agency action may take.309  Oth-
erwise, courts would be unresponsive to the range of regulatory strategies 
that Congress pursues to further complex legislative purposes.310  Mead in 
this regard encourages agencies to be flexible in undertaking their delegated 
authority and, just as importantly, requires courts to consider the “variety of 
ways” in which Congress may have implicitly delegated to an agency the 
                                                          
 300.  Id. at 226–28; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983 (discussing Mead). 
 301.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–28; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 
(2000). 
 302.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 303.  Id. at 226–27, 229.   
 304.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
 305.  Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 193 (2006). 
 306.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 235–36. 
 307.  Id. at 236. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993). 
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power to implement the statute at issue.311  This rule does not compromise 
judicial authority to scrutinize agency action, as much as impose on courts 
the sensible duty of being self-aware of the limits of their interpretive au-
thority.312  The doctrine has courts choose between obeying the agency in-
terpretation at issue, treating the agency view on the matter as a “constituent 
element[] of its own decision, as persuasive if not controlling,” or “as simp-
ly irrelevant.”313 
2.  An Alternative to Indifference in Aereo 
The various courts that heard the recent disputes involving Aereo and 
FilmOn did not consider the question of whether they ought to consult legal 
analysis of online video distribution by the Copyright Office or the FCC.314  
In their silence, the courts seemed to presume that they alone have the au-
thority or capacity to define the scope of protection under the Transmit 
Clause. 
As a formal matter, they are not necessarily wrong.  Congress did not 
explicitly delegate the authority to interpret the Transmit Clause to any in-
stitution and, under current doctrine, federal courts are not obliged to apply 
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation unless Congress manifests an 
intention to authorize that agency “to be able to speak with the force of 
law.”315  Neither the Copyright Office nor the FCC have an explicit obliga-
tion under the Copyright Act to fill gaps in the Transmit Clause or promul-
gate binding legal rules that interpret the public performance right.  It is 
likely for this reason that courts did not convey any doubt that they could 
ignore statements by the Copyright Office or the FCC on how to treat 
online video distribution.316  For the courts, those agencies are no more than 
ladies-in-waiting, to be ignored until a litigant challenges their interpreta-
tions in court. 
But existing doctrine, especially after Mead, does not require that 
courts be inattentive to agency interpretations of public law in fields about 
which Congress has assumed that they are expert.317  While there is no ex-
                                                          
 311.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003–05 
(2005) (Breyer, J. concurring) (discussing Mead). 
 312.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 
(quoting Skidmore). 
 313.  Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Re-
spect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 822–23 (2001). 
 314.  See supra Part I.D. 
 315.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
 316.  The matter would have been different if the litigants had argued or briefed the point.  
 317.  Cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27, 229 (“It can be apparent from the agency’s generally con-
ferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be 
able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in the statute or fills in a space in 
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plicit delegation of authority to interpret the Transmit Clause, one can infer 
from the Copyright Act that the Copyright Office has the authority to make 
sense of that provision when new technologies emerge.  This seems espe-
cially sensible in the video distribution context, where the Copyright Office 
and the FCC have been, and must be, very active. 
As I explained above, pursuant to legislative command,318 the Copy-
right Office and FCC have issued reports and administered proceedings on 
how disruptive emergent online video streaming applications are and 
whether they square with the terms of current law.319  To be sure, these 
agencies have not had the occasion (never mind the explicit authority) to 
say anything about how or whether unauthorized online video streaming of 
broadcast programming infringes broadcasters’ public performance right 
under the Transmit Clause.  But the Copyright Office and the FCC have 
committed substantial resources and their expertise to the general question 
on which the Aereo majority rested its holding: whether online streaming is 
like cable television service.  Before the Court decided Aereo, both agencies 
decided that online video distribution is not sufficiently like cable to war-
rant protection under at least two other related provisions under the Copy-
right Act and the Communications Act.320 
It is peculiar that existing doctrine could allow courts to ignore the 
substantial efforts that the Copyright Office and the FCC have expended on 
the point.  At a minimum, nothing in Mead or administrative law doctrine 
generally forbids courts from entertaining their conclusions. 
One might even assume that current administrative law doctrine em-
powers courts to consider agency interpretations of related provisions in the 
legislative field.  There are at least two reasons for this.  First, courts defer 
to agency interpretations even when they are not a party to the litigation be-
fore them.  This is true across different substantive areas, including matters 
related to the Aereo and FilmOn video distribution applications.  Consider 
again the ivi case.321  In ivi, in a dispute concerning the scope of coverage of 
the compulsory licensing provision, the Second Circuit deferred to the Cop-
yright Office’s repeated determination that online video applications are not 
like cable and, therefore, not entitled to a compulsory license to retransmit 
                                                          
the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not have intent as to a particular result.  
When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court must accept the agen-
cy’s position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpre-
tation is reasonable.”); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
 318.  See supra Part II. 
 319.  See supra Part III.A. 
 320.  See supra Part II.B. 
 321.  See supra notes 192–199 and accompanying text; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. 
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broadcast programming.322  The panel reached this conclusion even though 
the Copyright Office was not a party to the litigation.  The agency’s dele-
gated authority and expertise in the legislative field were enough to warrant 
deference.323   
Second, in Mead, the Court sought to accommodate the variety of 
ways in which Congress grants authority to agencies.324  Sometimes Con-
gress delegates to agencies the responsibility of promulgating rules that car-
ry the force of law.  Courts will give such agency actions Chevron defer-
ence.  Sometimes, however, Congress allows agencies to make “interpretive 
choices” that do not bind judges.325  Even in these cases, courts defer, con-
veying something between “near indifference” to simple respect to “sub-
stantial deference.”326  In any event, the specific features of the agency ac-
tion shape the “fair measure of deference” that courts choose to give.327  
The question in any such case is whether the agency’s interpretations bear 
any of the hallmarks of authority and expertise worthy of consideration. 
I accordingly propose here a framework for judicial interpretation of a 
statutory provision that is separate but intertwined with a general regulatory 
regime in which Congress has delegated administrative or lawmaking re-
sponsibilities to an agency.  The occasion for this kind of judicial review 
would be, as in Aereo, a dispute between private parties about the applica-
bility of an ambiguous provision to a novel technology otherwise regulated 
by the agency.  The agency’s interpretation would be entitled to considera-
tion to the extent it has authority to interpret a significantly related statutory 
provision.328 
Under the approach I propose here, the judicial inquiry about how far 
the public performance right reaches would not begin and end with an anal-
ysis of the Transmit Clause or related provisions in the Copyright Act.  
Courts also would as a matter of course consider whether the Copyright Of-
fice or the FCC has determined whether a new video distribution technolo-
gy is too unfamiliar (too disruptive) to fall within the ambit of the compul-
                                                          
 322.  WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283–84 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 323.  Id.  Or consider a decision from just this past term in which the Court, in determining the 
reach of a provision in the Federal Labor Standards Act, gave considerable consideration to the 
Department of Labor’s approach to “similar” concerns even though it was not a party to the litiga-
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 324.   United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).  
 325.  Id. at 227.  
 326.  Id. at 228 (quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 
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 328.  See supra Part III.B. 
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sory licensing, must-carry, retransmission consent, or program access 
laws—or, in the terms on which the Aereo court relied, whether those agen-
cies have decided whether video streaming is like cable or not. 
Attending to all of the public law of video distribution—legislation 
and agency action in the field—would best effectuate congressional intent.  
After all, the governing statutes reflect Congress’ decision that the balance 
of the diverse interests in the market for video programming distribution 
ought to be resolved in the first instance by the Copyright Office and the 
FCC.  Legislators concluded that those agencies are best situated to assess 
the efficacy of current law in light of new innovations.  It charged those 
agencies with the responsibility of keeping abreast of changes in the mar-
ket, reporting those findings to Congress, and promulgating binding regula-
tions when necessary to effectuate legislative intent.  These are the very 
kinds of regulatory interventions to which the Court has pointed to justify 
routine judicial deference to agencies.329 
Courts of general jurisdiction do not have the same claim to expertise 
or institutional authority under these circumstances.330  Nor can courts ad-
minister the careful policy balance embodied in video distribution law in 
the way that those agencies do on a case-by-case basis.  Of course, courts 
have an important role to play.  If neither Congress nor the pertinent agen-
cies have determined (or can agree on) how or whether any provision ap-
plies to a particular dispute, they should employ the full sweep of interpre-
tive tools to make sense of the law at issue as they normally would—that is, 
as the majority and dissent did in Aereo.  Courts in these cases would do so 
based on the assumption that they are the first to address the question gen-
erally or that, in their protracted silence, Congress and the agencies expect 
as much from the courts.331  In this regard, my proposal does nothing to di-
minish public law interpretation by courts. 
But when the Copyright Office or the FCC has determined that a new 
technology is too disruptive to justify applying a related provision in the 
Copyright Act or the Communications Act,332 as they have here, courts 
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ought to defer to or at least consider that prior agency interpretation, apart 
from whether it would produce a different result.  In this regard, my pro-
posal would inject a degree of humility and discipline to the interpretive 
endeavor that to this point has been sorely missing in this legislative 
field.333  More generally, it would be a corrective to the sense of interpretive 
exceptionalism in judicial interpretation. 
As it relates to judicial review of disputes concerning the application 
of the public performance right to online video streaming, my proposal 
would require courts to make several inquiries.  Courts should take into ac-
count whether the Copyright Office or the FCC has considered whether the 
emergent technology is covered by compulsory licensing, retransmission 
consent, must-carry, or program access laws before proceeding to an analy-
sis of the scope of broadcasters’ public performance rights.  If neither agen-
cy has spoken on the matter, I propose that courts engage in a de novo anal-
ysis of the applicability of the public performance right as they would a 
provision that no single agency has the responsibility of administering or 
implementing.  If, however, the Copyright Office or the FCC has indeed de-
termined one way or another how or whether a corollary provision applies 
to the new technology at issue, I would require courts to defer to that agen-
cy’s interpretation as a matter of course.334 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Online video streaming applications have turned the traditional broad-
cast model inside out.  Users today control what and how they watch video 
programming.  These services are so different today from what existed just 
a generation ago that, until a divided Supreme Court decided the matter last 
term, courts did not agree on how such services square with existing law.  
Courts were uncertain, for example, about whether the new technologies are 
sufficiently novel not to be covered under the public performance right, a 
provision that Congress included in the 1976 Copyright Act specifically to 
address the unique political economy of cable retransmission of broadcast 
programming. 
Today, at a time when so much in the market for internet-based appli-
cations and services is contested, I argue here that courts should be far more 
careful in their application of the public performance right to disruptive 
technologies like online video streaming than they have been.  Instead, they 
should defer to the agencies to which Congress has delegated the authority 
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to interpret interacting provisions under the Copyright Act—that is, to all of 
the public law that Congress has set in motion.  Courts, of course, should 
continue to be at their most searching when they are asked to interpret a 
provision that they have the authority to define in the first instance.  But 
they also should be far more careful when they are asked to make sense of a 
provision in a complex legislative field for which Congress has given to 
agencies the primary responsibility of updating and implementing during 
dramatic times of change. 
 
